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ABSTRACT 
Research and theory in social psychology and related fields indicates that people 
simultaneously hold many cultural identities. And it is well evidenced across relevant 
fields (e.g., sociology, marketing, economics) that salient identities are instrumental in a 
variety of cognitive and behavioral processes, including decision-making. It is not, 
however, well understood how the relative salience of various cultural identities factors 
into the process of making identity-relevant choices, particularly ones that require an 
actor to choose between conflicting sets of cultural values or beliefs. It is also unclear 
whether the source of that salience (e.g., chronic or situational) is meaningful in this 
regard. The current research makes novel predictions concerning the roles of cultural 
identity centrality and cultural identity situational salience in three distinct aspects of the 
decision-making process: Direction of decision, speed of decision, and emotion related to 
decision. In doing so, the research highlights two under-researched forms of culture (i.e., 
political and religious) and uses as the focal dependent variable a decision-making 
scenario that forces participants to choose between the values of their religious and 
political cultures and, to some degree, behave in an identity-inconsistent manner. Results 
indicate main effects of Christian identity centrality and democrat identity centrality on 
preference for traditional versus gender-neutral (i.e., non-traditional/progressive) 
restrooms after statistically controlling for covariates. Additionally, results show a 
significant main effect of democrat identity centrality and a significant interaction effect 
of Christian and democrat identity centrality on positive emotion linked to the decision. 
Post hoc analyses further reveal a significant quadratic relationship between Christian 
identity centrality and emotion related to the decision. There was no effect of situational 
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strength of democrat identity salience on the decision. Neither centrality or situational 
strength had any effect on the speed with which participants made their decisions. This 
research theoretically and empirically advances the study of cultural psychology and 
carries important implications for identity research and judgment and decision-making 
across a variety of fields, including management, behavioral economics, and marketing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Which of these two options should I choose? Which is a better reflection of who I 
am, or try to be? Why do I sometimes feel like I go against my own values and beliefs in 
making decisions?  
People are complex multicultural actors. It is crucial that researchers and 
practitioners in psychology, marketing, management, and politics broaden their view of 
culture, and develop a more nuanced understanding of multiculturalism and its complex 
role in human thought and action. The reason for this is that the cultures to which we 
belong (and there can be many to which we simultaneously belong; A. B. Cohen, 2009) 
help shape our sense of who we are; our self-concept. And our self-concept, in turn, acts 
as a schema that guides many of our cognitive and behavioral processes, including, but 
not limited to, the manner in which we make decisions (Mandel, 2003; Markus & 
Kitayama, 2010).  
While we know from social, cultural, and organizational psychology that 
members of different cultures (usually, different ethnicities or nationalities) make 
decisions in certain different ways (e.g., cultural frame switching; Benet-Martinez, Leu, 
Lee, & Morris, 2002), this area of research deals almost exclusively with national (or 
east/west) culture. Furthermore, culture research has had little to say about when and why 
our various cultural identities (thinking of culture very broadly) become salient, whether 
the cause or degree of salience is meaningful in guiding behavior, or the various ways in 
which conflicting or complimentary salient cultural identities impact decision processes. 
The intent with the current research is to advance theory regarding cultural contributions 
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to, and centrality within, the self-concept, and to demonstrate how the culturally-
informed self-concept influences three specific aspects of decision-making: Direction of 
decision, speed of decision, and emotion related to decision.  
The current research adds to the literature in a variety of ways. First, it for the first 
time addresses the chronic salience (i.e., centrality) of cultural memberships (via cultural 
identity). And while it does this in part by using relevant existing theory from identity 
research (e.g., Identity Theory; Stryker, 1968, 1987), it also expands upon this theory by 
investigating the interactive role of multiple incongruent cultural identities that are 
central to varying degrees. Second, it investigates the relative effects of chronic cultural 
identity salience and situational identity salience on decision-making.  
Third, it is the first research in either the culture or identity areas to treat 
situational strength (i.e., social pressure to conform to group norms or expectations; 
Mischel, 1977) as a potentially important factor in whether decisions track chronic 
cultural identity salience or situational cultural identity salience. Finally, while the 
direction of one’s decision (e.g., whether the decision is consistent with the underlying 
values, norms, etc. of a salient identity) is always an outcome of interest, and is in the 
current research, it is not the only important aspect of the decision process with regard to 
intrapersonal culture conflict. The current research is the first to explore how incongruent 
salient cultural identities affect speed of decisions and emotion related to recently made 
decisions, and it discusses the implications of these decision outcomes for various 
relevant fields. 
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Culture and Self-Concept 
To understand the role of culture in self and identity, one must first have a sense 
of what a culture is. While many aspects of culture can affect decision processes, the field 
has not done a comprehensive job laying the groundwork. The vast majority of the 
psychological research on culture has focused on a limited set of forms of cultural 
variation (i.e., national/geographical), made comparisons between east and west (e.g., 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991), and largely made use of a single cultural dimension; 
individualism/collectivism (Hofstede, 2011). This approach to cultural research is 
consistent with the notion that culture, by definition, involves shared geography and 
language (Triandis, 1996). 
While this view of culture and line of cultural research have been valuable and 
have produced some of the most important and widely-cited findings in all of 
psychology, one should be careful not to let their conception of culture be confined to 
only these groups, dimensions, and cultural forms, or to assume these are the only aspects 
of cultures that are important to identity and/or decision-making. As argued by A. B. 
Cohen (2009), there can even be culture shared between people who live in different 
countries and who speak different languages. With this in mind, the view of culture to be 
implemented in the current research, and the one more in-line with the ‘many forms of 
culture’ notion, is articulated well by Fiske (2002), who contends that culture is: 
…a socially transmitted or socially constructed constellation consisting of such 
things as practices, competencies, ideas, schemas, symbols, values, norms, 
institutions, goals, constitutive rules, artifacts, and modifications of the physical 
environment (p. 85).   
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Indeed, there is now compelling evidence in social psychology for regions (e.g., 
southeast United States) as cultures (D. Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996), 
religions as cultures (A. B. Cohen, 2015) and socio-economic statuses (SES) as cultures 
(A. B. Cohen & Varnum, 2016), among others. Additionally, the notion of organizational 
or institutional culture has been present in the business, I/O psychology and education 
literatures for decades (see, Smircich, 1983). Still, we do not know whether the identities 
linked to such cultures follow predictable patterns in relative chronic centrality, or 
whether they are more idiosyncratic (people vary widely in centrality and the reasons for 
it). Nor do we have a well-developed understanding of the implications of this for 
decision-making.   
Regarding culture and the self, Markus and Kitayama (2010) note that our 
psychological processes form, and are formed by, our social/cultural surroundings and 
structures. Selves and cultures, they argue, are mutually constituting, and are, therefore, 
dynamic in their influence on one another. They suggest that “Being a person—a self—
requires input from sociocultural meanings and practices, and the self is the center of 
awareness and agency that incorporates and reflects these sociocultural patterns” (p. 423). 
In keeping with this, the current research suggests that, with regard to culture, the self is 
an amalgamation of cultural ‘selves’ or identities, with at least some representation of 
every culture to which we belong. 
Content and Structure of Self 
There have been many terms used in the research regarding the ‘self,’ including 
self-concept, self-schema, self-knowledge, self-perception, and identity. There is a fair 
amount of overlap in certain of these terms and an active debate as to how each should be 
 
 
5 
 
conceived and defined (see Baumeister, 1987). Some terms might refer to the actual self 
or the contents of the self, while other terms might refer to how the self is organized 
cognitively, or to one’s knowledge or perception of oneself. What these self-related terms 
have in common is the goal of establishing the process by which the biological being 
becomes a meaningful being, or person (Markus & Kitayama, 2010).  
The current research uses the term self-concept to refer to the general self (i.e., the 
collective of all, more specific identities), because this term has typically been used in 
conjunction with self-regulation, agency or action (Markus & Wurf, 1987), which is 
important given the decision-making component of this research. It will also, however, 
use the term identity, often when referring to the individual, lower-order ‘selves’ that are 
linked to specific cultures (and other groups and individual characteristics), and that 
combine to make up the overall self-concept. The rationale is that much of the prior 
research and theory discussed herein uses the term identity to refer to conceptions of self 
that are tied to specific characteristics, groups or social roles (e.g., Social Identity Theory; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is not, however, important to the current research to attempt to 
meaningfully distinguish between these closely-related terms.  
 Classic research and theory on self-concept in psychology suggests that self-
concept can be broadly split into two sub-components: Content and structure (Campbell 
et al., 1996). Content consists of self-knowledge (i.e., who am I?) and self-evaluations 
(e.g., what do I think of myself?). Structure refers to how that content is organized, and 
includes elements such as complexity (e.g. Linville, 1985), clarity (e.g., Campbell et al., 
1996) and consistency (e.g. Gergen & Morse, 1967).   
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Of the various selves or identities that collectively form a person’s self-concept 
(content), some are of a personal nature (e.g., tall, introverted, intelligent) and some are 
of a group or cultural nature (e.g., American, Catholic, soldier). Evidence of the 
variability of selves that can exist within the overall self-concept can be seen in research 
using the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), which simply asks people 
to answer 20 times the question ‘who am I?’ The current research, because of its focus on 
cultural identities, will exclusively emphasize cultural inputs to the self-concept, and 
investigate questions pertaining to both the content and structure of self-concept.  
Of critical importance in the current research, not only are there more forms of 
culture than have been well explored in psychology, but the identities linked to these 
cultures combine in ways which should, in theory, affect decision-making. One is not just 
an American or a Southerner or a Christian or a soldier. One might be an American, 
Southern, Christian soldier. And, these individual cultural identities can be central to 
one’s overall self-concept to varying degrees. To use an organizational example, in the 
same military squad, there might be two American, Southern, Christian soldiers – but for 
one, American might be the most central identity, while for another, being a solider might 
be the most central identity. We would expect that these two individuals may make 
certain decisions differently in order for each to be consistent with the centrality 
hierarchy of their cultural identities.  
Moreover, it is not simply that the first individual might make decisions solely as 
an American and the second individual as a soldier, but that the combination of identities 
will interact to affect relevant decision-making in unique ways. A variety of factors may 
be integral to this, including qualitative and quantitative differences between the salient 
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cultural identities, whether, and to what degree, those differences are pertinent to the 
decision that needs to be made (or the cultural issues embedded within the decision), and 
what the source of identity salience is (chronic/centrality-based or situational). 
Possession and Relative Salience of Multiple (Cultural) Identities 
 In order for the current research to make theoretically-grounded predictions 
regarding decision-making based on some prioritization or salience of cultural selves, it 
is useful to draw upon existing theory and research related to this phenomenon across a 
variety of fields. Indeed, the notion of multiple selves or identities, as well as how those 
identities might be organized, has been the focus of researchers in areas ranging from 
psychology and sociology to business and organizational behavior. So, how do people 
organize their cultural identities? Or, perhaps the question should be, why might people’s 
cultural identities be centralized to varying degrees? Like many social phenomena, in lieu 
of a clear, unanimously agreed upon answer to these questions, there are several answers 
which are in some ways overlapping and in some ways divergent. 
The idea of multiple discrete selves, or identities, is not a new one. James (1890) 
maintained that the ‘empirical self’ comprised a material, social, and spiritual self, and 
that each of these selves contained its own sub-set of multiple selves. Multiple individual 
identities are also evident in the Role Theory work of Mead (1934), who emphasized the 
importance of interpersonal interaction in the development of multiple ‘selves.’ Role 
Theory has, in fact, amassed a substantial literature over the past century, and might be 
considered the most popular explanatory framework for the link between group identity 
and behavior (e.g., Simmel, 1920; Mead, 1934; Linton, 1936; Moreno, 1934).  
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Later theories in social psychology have, in their own ways, acknowledged the 
multifaceted self. Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979), for example, specifies that the self is derived, in large part, from social identities 
and perceived group memberships. SIT laid the theoretical groundwork for a variety of 
related theories and research including Social Categorization Theory (SCT; Tajfel 1979) 
and research on social identity processes such as increasing positive self-esteem and self 
enhancement (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988). None of the above-mentioned lines of 
inquiry, however, have attempted to address how, when, and why multiple identities 
might be more or less central to one’s overall sense of self.  
But there has been research to specifically address identity prioritization. In 
psychology, for example, Rosenberg (1979) provides us with the notion of psychological 
centrality of social identities. Specifically, a person’s identities vary in the degree to 
which they are central or peripheral according to how much they are perceived to ‘count’ 
by the person (i.e., how important they are). Work by other researchers has provided 
alternative explanations for how identities are prioritized within the overall self. 
Ramarajan (2014), for example, theorizes about an identity network which can be dense 
(i.e., lots of overlap between identities) or sparse (i.e., little overlap between identities). 
Importantly, this theory also specifies that, of our many identities, only some are 
activated at any one time; the others are dormant. The ‘network’ consists only of 
activated identities (e.g., only soldier and Christian may be activated from among a dozen 
or more identities).  
Identity theory, role commitment, and chronic salience (centrality). Identity 
Theory (Stryker, 1968, 1987) in sociology has provided perhaps the most cogent 
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framework for a hierarchical structure of the multiple identities within the self. Stryker 
argues that one has a portfolio of selves from which to choose, and the likelihood that an 
identity (or role) will be called upon exists according to a salience hierarchy based on 
one’s ‘commitment’ to their various roles.  
Role commitment, according to Stryker, exists in two forms: Interactional 
commitment, which is the number of valued relationships associated with that role, as 
well as how often one interacts with those in that role; and affective commitment, which 
is the depth of emotion associated with relationships in that role and the perceived loss 
one would feel if relationships associated with that role were to be terminated. 
Commitment, in this sense, has been shown by Identity Theory researchers to be 
predictive of both role salience (i.e., centrality) and role-consistent behavior (e.g., 
Merolla, Serpe, Stryker, & Schultz, 2012). Identity Theory’s original use of commitment 
as the grand single factor in identity salience and prioritization suggests that the readiness 
to act out a role lies entirely within the person (and their commitment) and is stable 
across situations. This is an important point to the current research and will be revisited 
later in this section.  
Identity Theory researchers McCall and Simmons (1978) propose a somewhat 
different framework for the organization of identities that takes into account the role of 
both chronic and situational identity salience (though they use slightly different wording). 
They argue that there are two related hierarchies of identities. The first is the ideal self, 
which is a hierarchy of prominence and the basis for long-term prediction of behavior. 
The location of an identity within this hierarchy is the consequence of support provided 
to that identity by the person and others, commitment and investment to the identity and 
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intrinsic and extrinsic gratification associated with identity. The second is the situational 
self, which is a hierarchy of salience and the basis for short term predictions of behavior. 
The position of an identity in this hierarchy depends on the salience of an identity, its 
need for support, the person’s need for satisfaction gained from its presentation, and the 
perceived opportunity for rewarding presentation of the identity. Important to this overall 
theory of identity hierarchy is that salience determines prominence. Also, a person’s 
affective response toward an identity will determine its place in both hierarchies. 
An important area of agreement between each of these different conceptions of 
the hierarchical organization of self is that prioritization, or centrality, of identities, roles, 
or selves is driven by salience. There is clearly much debate, however, as to what 
‘salience’ entails, what its source is, and what its precise relationship is to self-consistent 
behavior. For example, Stryker’s (original) Identity Theory perhaps fails to sufficiently 
account for situational factors influencing the hierarchy of identities. Much early research 
on identity theory maintains that identity salience remains stable across time and 
situation, and that people will seek out situations that allow them to behave in accordance 
with their current salience structure (Serpe, 1987; Serpe & Stryker, 1987).  
By this logic, a soldier who prioritizes their Christian self above their military self 
would carry that prioritization from situation to situation, always behaving in a manner 
most consistent with the values, beliefs, etc. associated with that, most prioritized self. 
Surely one can think of examples where this would not be the case. Later identity 
theorists do account for the role of situations in identity salience (McCall & Simmons, 
1978), though perhaps not in a way that addresses the extent to which situational salience 
interacts with chronic salience (or identity prominence as they call it) to affect behavior. 
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Ramarajan’s (2014) theory regarding activation of individual identities also seems 
to account for the influence of the situation on identity salience. However, this theory 
perhaps fails to sufficiently take person-level factors into account (e.g., centrality). Also, 
it proposes that situations activate only some of a person’s identities, while others are left 
dormant. This notion of the self as being always dichotomously split between active and 
dormant identities seems imperfect because it will never fully account for the additive or 
moderating effect that less prioritized (what Ramarajan would call dormant) identities 
have on the relationship between the most salient (active) identities and the chosen 
behavior. Ramarajan argues that two or more identities are activated in any given 
situation, but that no prioritization between them is taking place. They are simply equal, 
as activated identities, and some degree of compatible and contrasting (Ramarajan, 
Rothbard, & Wilk, 2016).  
The current research takes the position that, from a social psychological 
perspective, none of the aforementioned theories or lines of work sufficiently capture the 
cause(s) of identity salience, and thus identity prioritization and self-consistent behavior. 
A more comprehensive theory of identity salience might combine portions of the theories 
of both Stryker and Ramarajan (as well as other work that stems from, or is closely 
related to, this work). Specifically, with regard to situational identity salience, it seems 
improper to ignore the fact that situations are not all equal in the degree to which they 
evoke group or cultural thoughts or feelings, or in the degree to which they apply 
pressure to conform to group or cultural norms or expectations. With that in mind, the 
current research proposes that situational salience needs to, at the very least, take 
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situational strength (Mischel, 1977) into account, particularly when considering any 
effect on behavior or decision processes.  
Additionally, with regard to chronic salience or centrality, while Identity Theory’s 
notion of commitment clearly plays an important role, it could perhaps benefit from 
theoretical supplementing. That is, number of, and emotional investment in, role-specific 
relationships is perhaps not the only, or even the most powerful, predictor of chronic 
identity centrality. It may be that other, similarly deeply-rooted and socially-distal factors 
are at play. With that in mind, it is proposed that the perceived evolutionary fitness 
benefits credited to a particular group, culture, or role should account for meaningful 
variance in chronic identity centrality. 
Perceived fitness benefits as a source of centrality. One of the principal ideas in 
the evolutionary psychology meta-theoretical perspective is that, to a large degree, our 
perceptions, cognitions, and behavior are consciously or unconsciously influenced by 
basic human goals and need states (Bargh, 1990). A central tenet of this idea is that the 
goals and motives that have the most powerful and immediate effect are closely linked to 
the management of adaptive problems (i.e., problems that directly or indirectly inhibit 
genetic or inclusive fitness; Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003). These goals and needs include 
self-protection from danger, disease avoidance, affiliation (e.g., friendship, coalition 
building), status, mate acquisition, mate retention, and kin care (Kenrick, Griskevicius, 
Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010). They can be thought of as existing in a hierarchy as listed 
here, in that the satisfaction of one goal can often not take place until the previous goal 
has been satisfied. Crucially, however, there is freedom of movement within the 
hierarchy, largely according to situational or environmental changes. For example, a man 
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who has attained high status and a reproductive mate still needs to protect himself (and 
his mate) from danger if the situation calls for it. 
Empirical research based on the fundamental social motives has addressed a wide 
variety of questions in psychology and other fields and produced much evidence of the 
robust predictive power of this framework (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Gangestad & 
Simpson, 2000; Kenrick, Li, White, & Neuberg, 2012). In the context of the current 
research, it may be that the fundamental motive framework works somewhat 
synergistically with Identity Theory in explaining the deeply rooted causes of identity 
centrality. It seems reasonable that the cultural groups that are most conducive to, or that 
best facilitate, the solving of adaptive problems and the reaching of evolutionary goals 
might be the most highly valued, particularly if decision-making follows directly from 
identity centrality. It would therefore be expected that identities linked to the cultures that 
provide the most assistance in the solving of evolutionary problems would be the most 
central, and therefore the most called upon in decision scenarios (all other things being 
equal). 
Cultural Identities and Decision-Making 
A wealth of research exists across a variety of fields that lends support to the 
notion of self or identity-consistent thought and behavior. As articulated by Markus and 
Kitayama (2010), the self is ‘at work’ in all types of cognition and behavior, including 
attention, perception, cognition, motivation and decision-making. That is, the self-
concept functions as the overarching system that calls upon and arranges these more 
precise self-regulatory systems. Additionally, people are motivated to behave consistently 
with their self-concept in order to avoid negative emotions that accompany self-
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discrepant thinking and behavior (Higgins, 1987). And, at least in North America, people 
are happier, nicer and more intelligent when their selves are verified through their actions 
(e.g., Oyserman, 2008; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002).  
Research in social psychology has begun to establish a link between behavior and 
culturally-informed selves or identities. Work on bicultural identity has highlighted the 
ability of people who hold both East Asian and Western identities to ‘frame switch.’ That 
is, the ability to think and behave consistently with the values, beliefs or norms of 
whichever of their cultures is made salient (Benet-Martinez et al., 2002). Some research 
in this area has used what has become known as the dynamic constructivist approach, 
which posits that cultural icons may be used to make salient the commonly available 
cultural meanings and practices with which they are associated (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & 
Benet-Martinez, 2000).  
In a pioneering study by Hong et al. (2000), bicultural participants who were 
exposed to Chinese images, such as dragons and the Great Wall, behaved more 
interdependently. When they were exposed to American scenes, such as the Statue of 
Liberty or the Liberty Bell, they behaved more independently. Findings such as these 
provide evidence for the human capacity to hold different cultural identities 
simultaneously, and to behave in a manner consistent with only the one that is most 
salient. Moreover, this is true even when the two cultures are of the same type (i.e., 
national), and are theoretical opposites with regard to the cultural dimension in question 
(i.e., independence/interdependence). However, though this line of work is specific to 
cultural identities and behavior, it does not adopt a very broad view of culture, nor does it 
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address various types (i.e., chronic or situational) and degrees (strong or weak situations) 
of cultural identity salience. 
In other fields, including sociology, economics and organizational behavior, 
researchers have likewise made contributions to the collective evidence regarding the 
ability, and tendency, of people to behave consistently with a salient identity or identities. 
Stryker (2008) notes, for example, that Identity Theory’s fundamental position 
hypothesizes that the choice between or among behaviors expressive of particular roles 
will reflect the relative locations of the identities in the identity hierarchy. For example, 
Stryker and Serpe (1982) found that level of commitment to a religious identity predicted 
salience of that same identity, as well as amount of time spent engaging in religious 
activities. 
Work by Callero (1985) adds that identity salience is linked to viewing others in 
terms of role identity, increased social relations premised on role identity, expectations of 
others and prosocial behavior (e.g., donating blood). Karen Winterich and colleagues 
provide additional empirical support for the effect of salient social identities on behavior. 
A recent study shows that conservatives, who are known for being highly conforming, 
gave to charity when membership in a non-political group shared with charitable liberals 
was made salient (Kaikati, Torelli, Winterich, & Rhodas, 2017). Importantly, the effect 
went away when political orientation was made salient in the study because, ostensibly, 
behaving like a conservative overpowered the natural inclination of conservatives to 
generally conform. 
Notably, research in economics has also endorsed the importance of self-concept 
or identity in the process of choosing. The logic of appropriateness theory of decision-
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making (March, 1999) includes only three essential components of the decision-making 
process. The first is that situations are identified according to distinct categories (e.g., 
cultural categories). For example, a Protestant Christian may identify a religious 
ceremony as being part of a ‘religious culture’ category. The second is that those 
categories are matched with the identities that decision-makers use in determining 
appropriate behavior in a situation (March notes that different identities may be mobilized 
in different situations). For example, a Christian may match the ‘religious culture’ 
category with his or her Christian identity, which is then used in determining appropriate 
behavior in the situation. The third is that the matching of identities to situations results in 
attentional allocation and response selection appropriate for the mobilized identity and 
the observed situation. For example, the Christian would then make decisions in that 
ceremonial situation that are appropriate for the mobilized Christian identity (e.g., 
forgiving rather than angering if bumped into).  
March contends that decision-making is, in fact, identity fulfilment rather than the 
attainment of best results. Moreover, this theory suggests that decision-making does not 
represent goal pursuit and/or the calculation of future consequences that may result from 
one’s actions. Rather, this notion of decision-making simply assumes that a set of rules, 
summarized by the concept of identity (a set of rules, norms, values and assumptions that 
are associated with a system in which they are meaningful and important), are matched 
with a situation (March, 1999). 
 Decision-Making under conflict. Because the focus of the current research is on 
two (or more) simultaneously salient cultural identities, it is also worth noting that there 
is existing multidisciplinary research that elucidates the issue of multiple salient identities 
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being in conflict with one another, and the implications that this may carry for behavior. 
Ramarajan, whose work on the identity network states that, at any given time, some 
identities are active while some are dormant, argues that identity conflict and 
compatibility are predictors of interpersonal problem solving. Quite simply, when 
identities are compatible, problems are solved more efficiently. He further maintains that 
conflict and compatibility are, in fact, two orthogonal dimensions rather than opposite 
ends of the same dimension (Ramarajan et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, Identity Theorists have introduced a cybernetics model of control to 
explain the relationship between identity and behavior (Burke, 1991). According to this 
model, identities and perceived expectations associated with identities serve as reference 
points for behavior. When a situation activates an identity, a person compares the 
expectations of the identity to the overall self (i.e., according to their commitment-driven 
identity hierarchy). If a difference exists between them, behavior is altered in order to 
align the behavior with the self (Stryker & Burke, 2000). 
Finally, with regard to identity conflict, Blake Ashforth’s work (see Ashforth, 
1989) on organizational identification, which is based in SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
notes that there are identities within the organization that are nested (team, division, 
organization, industry, etc.) as well as, of course, non-organizational identities. Any/all of 
these can be potential areas for cohesion or conflict with regard to the values, beliefs, etc. 
associated with the various social groups. Ashforth’s research shows that, when multiple 
identities are made salient in a scenario (e.g., multiple nested organizational identities 
may be made salient in a work scenario), people tend to favor lower order identities 
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rather than higher order identities because they are more proximal, concrete and 
exclusive. They constitute the ‘primary group’ and are central to task interdependence. 
It is also worth noting that much work in marketing has investigated the role of 
tradeoffs in decision-making (e.g., Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 2001). This is pertinent to 
the current research in that identity conflict in decision-making scenarios can also be seen 
as an identity tradeoff. Particularly relevant to the current research, Luce, Payne, and 
Bettman (1999) found that decisions involving tradeoffs (e.g., quality versus price) often 
elicit negative emotions. Furthermore, research in this line has demonstrated that, as a 
result of the accompanying negative emotions, people generally avoid decisions that 
involve tradeoffs (Luce, 1998).  
Need for Research in Cultural Identity and Decision-Making 
The aforementioned theories and research collectively provide a rationale from 
the various literatures for the notion of a functional self-concept in the process of 
decision-making. The current research takes the position that, in certain decision-making 
scenarios, more than one choice may seem appropriate or representative of self-consistent 
behavior because more than one culture-based identity may be salient (or mobilized, in 
the words of March). One may be unable to behave consistently with both, particularly if 
the cultures differ from one another significantly along a dimension or set of dimensions 
relevant to the decision being made. However, it is, again, unclear whether it is the 
deeply-rooted internal centrality of the cultural identity or the external, situational 
salience that is the more powerful determinant of self-consistent behavior.  
Work on chronic versus temporary accessibility of constructs suggests that there 
is an additive effect when both are present that increases the likelihood of a construct’s 
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use (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986). So, for example, if both centrality and 
situational salience of a southern (i.e., southeast U.S.) identity are present, it should result 
in a higher likelihood of behaving in a ‘southern manner’ than if centrality or situational 
salience alone were present. This does not, however, account for potential interactive 
effects of conflicting constructs, either chronic or temporary. 
In keeping with classic social psychological theory regarding the inherent 
interaction between person and situation (See Mischel, 1977; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; 
Weiss & Adler, 1984), one might expect that cultural identity consistent decisions are 
primarily driven by personal factors (e.g., centrality), but moderated by conflicting 
factors associated with the situation (e.g., the demographic makeup of the environment, 
pressure to conform, etc.). In a person who has chronic salience of both military and 
California cultural identities, making California culture salient in a situation that 
highlights the incongruence of those cultures may have an additive effect on the 
likelihood of behaving in ‘California manner,’ but should have an interaction effect on 
the likelihood of behaving in a ‘military manner.’  
Moreover, it should be noted that, just as people vary in their commitment to a 
role or identity, situations vary in the social pressures that they place on the individual, 
and it seems that the research has not addressed how variability in situational strength 
(see Mischel, 1977) may factor into identity-based decision-making. This is a critical 
point in the current research – not all situations (that make salient a cultural identity) are 
equally likely to add to, or interact with, chronically salient cultural identities, or 
influence behavioral outcomes. 
 
 
 
20 
 
Current Research 
Self-concept provides a schema that is utilized in a variety of cognitive and 
behavioral processes, and people are motivated to behave in ways consistent with their 
overall self-concept and/or their individual identities. However, we still do not have a 
good understanding of the various cultural identities contained in the self, how and why 
they are prioritized, and how they interact in various decision-making circumstances. 
The current research adds overlooked components to the picture of cultures and 
the self—how the relative centrality and/or situational salience of multiple incongruent 
cultural identities affects decision-making. To be clear, the aim is to advance theory and 
research primarily in the field of cultural psychology by drawing upon and synthesizing 
work on culture, self-concept, and identity across a variety literatures and fields as well as 
incorporating novel theoretical pieces. The project investigates how (chronically and/or 
situationally) salient cultural identities interact with one another as components of a 
functional self-concept that guides decision-making.  
The current research highlights religious culture and political culture for the 
purposes of making predictions regarding cultural identity salience and decision-making. 
The rationale for this is twofold: First, intrapersonal political and religious culture 
conflict in decision-making makes for novel and provocative research in an area (i.e., 
culture) that has long focused on national and ethnic groups. It is acknowledged that past 
research on social influence has highlighted the ability of religious and other cultural 
primes to influence political decision-making (LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson & Finkle, 
2012). And while the current research capitalizes on some of the theory and methods 
used in such studies (e.g., salience through priming), it is less concerned with the ability 
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of religious salience to influence political decisions (for example), and more concerned 
with the how degree and type of salience of conflicting cultural identities are meaningful 
in decision processes. 
Second, research has recognized that certain religions and political affiliations 
overlap to such an extent that they are often thought of as being culturally one and the 
same (e.g., Hunter, 1991; Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). 
However, it is important to not conflate these cultural groups, and to remember that they 
may diverge in key ways (e.g., though the Christian and republican groups may seem 
culturally similar, they may differ in the extent to which they value personal sacrifice, 
conciliatory versus retaliatory response to interpersonal conflict, etc.). Conversely, people 
can also be simultaneous members of religious and political groups that seem to be 
cultural opposites in many ways (e.g., Christian and democrat). It is important to 
highlight that fact and investigate how such people might navigate culturally ambiguous 
decisions. Importantly, regardless of how well aligned one’s cultural groups are, there 
will always be areas of divergence between any two cultures. These areas make for 
interesting and demonstrable decision scenarios.  
The current research also makes predictions regarding elements of the decision-
making process beyond the decision itself. That is, how quickly one decides and how 
they feel emotionally about their decision are overlooked aspects of the decision-making 
process, and carry potentially important implications depending on the context and type 
of decision. For example, police officers need to be able to decide quickly whether they 
are willing/able to take a person’s life. Even a marginally slower decision process 
resulting from conflicting religious and political values might be very costly. Regarding 
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emotionality of decision-making, post-decision negative emotion due to simultaneously 
salient incongruent identities might, in addition to being generally negative for the actor, 
result in mind-changing or back-tracking (e.g., a shopper returning a purchase that they 
just don’t feel good about). As noted above, research in marketing has even highlighted 
the tendency of people to avoid conflict laden decision-making scenarios due to the 
accompanying negative emotions (Luce, 1998). 
The current research answers the following questions: 
1. Do people make decisions in a manner consistent with cultural identity 
centrality? 
2. How do two incongruent cultural identities interact to influence decision-
making?  
3. Does situational strength (of situations that make salient a cultural identity) 
influence decision-making, or interact with conflicting cultural identity 
centrality in doing so? 
Overview of Predictions 
Foundational predictions: Cultural identity centrality in decision-making. 
People will make decisions according to the centrality of cultural identities that are, 
because of underlying cultural beliefs, values, norms, etc., relevant to the decision. 
Additionally, the manner in which chronically salient (i.e., central) cultural identities 
interact to influence decision-making depends on the extent to which each is central to 
the person, and on the extent to which the identities in question are complimentary or 
conflicting with regard to the decision being made. Whereas past research has shown the 
ability of bicultural people to behave consistently with a salient culture (e.g., Hong et al., 
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2000), this phenomenon has only been examined within cultural types (e.g., national 
cultural), rather than between (e.g., religious and political). Furthermore, cultural research 
in this area has emphasized situational salience (as opposed to chronic salience), and has 
not investigated the effects of multiple salient cultures.  
The current research proposes that cultural identity centrality will predict 
decision-making consistent with the underlying values, beliefs, norms, etc. of that culture. 
Specifically, those high in Christian identity centrality will be more likely than those low 
in Christian identity centrality to choose to support a traditional option rather than one 
that indicates change. Conversely, those high in democrat identity centrality will be more 
likely than those low in democrat identity centrality to choose an option that indicates 
change rather than a traditional one. These predictions are tested in preliminary analyses 
prior to the testing of main hypotheses. 
Main predictions: Chronic and situational salience in decision-making. When 
two salient cultural identities are conflicting with regard to the underlying values, beliefs, 
etc. that are relevant to a decision, the decision will be significantly slower (because there 
should be increased intrapersonal conflict in determining the ‘correct’ course of action) 
and result in negative emotions associated with the decision (due to self-consistent 
dissonance surrounding the decision; Higgins, 1987). Furthermore, decisions will be 
consistent with a cultural identity that is chronically salient (i.e., central), rather than a 
conflicting cultural identity that is made salient in a ‘weak’ situation (see Mischel, 1977). 
That is, chronic cultural identity salience, which is deeply rooted in social and 
evolutionary motives, should not be overpowered by simply being ‘reminded’ of another 
cultural identity. Therefore, I predict that Christian-democrats who are high in Christian 
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identity centrality but not high in democrat identity centrality will make decisions that are 
consistent with Christian culture and inconsistent with democrat culture, even when their 
democrat identity is made situationally salient.  
However, in ‘strong’ situations (i.e., where there exists added social pressure to 
conform, or behave in a manner that demonstrates group or cultural loyalty), decisions 
will favor cultural identities made salient by the situation over chronically salient 
conflicting cultural identities (see Mischel, 1977). This will be true even when the 
cultural identity made salient by the strong situation is low in centrality. The theoretical 
rationale for this is that the social pressure to conform (or demonstrate loyalty) bought on 
by the strong situation will overpower the effect of centrality of a conflicting culture on a 
decision scenario. To be clear, this would mean that the more socially and evolutionarily 
beneficial cultural identities would be trumped by those made temporarily salient in a 
strong situation.  
Specifically, I predict that Christian democrats who are high in Christian identity 
centrality but low in democrat identity centrality will make a decision that is consistent 
with democrat culture and inconsistent with Christian culture when democrat culture is 
made situationally salient in a ‘strong’ manner. Moreover, this decision will be slower 
and more emotionally taxing than when democrat culture is made salient in a ‘weak’ 
manner. Importantly, centrality itself will not change as result of situational salience. 
That is, neither weak nor strong situations that make salient democrat identity will alter 
the centrality of either cultural identity; they will only alter the decision-making outcome.  
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Hypotheses 
H1a. I predict main effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality and 
Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision DV (see pilot below which describes the 
choosing of a decision DV), such that high-centrality Christians, low-centrality 
democrats, and those in the weak democrat situation will all be significantly more 
supportive of traditional restrooms than their respective counterparts. 
H1b. I predict a two-way interaction between Christian Centrality and Situation 
Strength on the Restroom Decision, such that low-centrality Christians will support 
gender-neutral restrooms (i.e., the choice more consistent with democrat values) in both 
the strong and weak democrat situations, but high-centrality Christians will only support 
gender-neutral restrooms in the strong democrat situation. Their responses will be 
significantly more toward traditional restrooms in the weak situation.  
H2a. I predict a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Speed (i.e., 
response time to the Restroom Decision), such that all responses will be significantly 
slower in the strong condition than in the weak condition. 
H2b. I predict a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and 
Democrat Centrality on Decision Speed, such that those high in both Christian Centrality 
and Democrat Centrality will make the decision significantly slower than will both those 
high in one and low in the other, and those low in both.  
H3a. I predict a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Affect (i.e., 
positive affect related to the Restroom Decision), such that positive affect will be 
significantly lower in the strong condition than in the weak condition. 
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H3b. I predict a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and 
Democrat Centrality on Decision Affect, such that those high in both Christian Centrality 
and Democrat Centrality will have significantly lower positive affect than will both those 
high in one and low in the other, and those low in both. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PILOT STUDY 
In order to find a decision-making DV that was suitable for the main study, it was 
necessary to run a pilot study that tested, in an exploratory manner, several decision items 
that represented theoretically plausible issues on which members of religious and 
political groups might hold differing opinions. Identifying the best decision item to use in 
the main study involved assessing responses to each decision-making item by religious 
and political group membership, as well as examining the relationship of decision item 
responses to religious and political cultural identity centrality. It was predetermined that, 
in order to recruit an adequate sample for the main study, the religious culture in question 
needed to be Christian (i.e., the largest broad religious group by membership in the 
United States), and the political culture in question could be either democrat or 
republican (i.e., the two largest political groups by membership in the United States).  
It was unimportant to the current research whether cultural identity incongruence 
(for the main study) was established between the Christian and democrat cultures or the 
Christian and republican cultures. Though, because there is theory and research to 
suggest that political conservatives and the highly religious share many of the same 
values and beliefs, particularly regarding social/cultural issues (e.g., opposition of 
abortion; Jelen, 2009; Layman & Green, 2005), more of the decision tasks in the pilot 
study highlighted Christian-democrat differences than Christian-republican differences. 
Ultimately, however, the statistical results from the pilot would guide which decision 
item, underlying cultural issue, and two cultures (Christian-democrat or Christian-
republican) would be used in the main study. 
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Many of the cultural values or beliefs embedded in the decision items in the pilot 
study were gleaned from existing work on religious and political similarities and 
differences (e.g., Malka, Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen, & Miller, 2012). These decision 
items were developed to capture issues known from previous research to be relevant to 
religious and political values and beliefs, but were disguised so as not to be overtly 
politically or religiously charged. 
Additionally, some decision items in the pilot were the result of original theory-
building efforts regarding how and why political and religious cultures might differ 
ideologically. While it is acknowledged that this method of theorizing is susceptible to 
bias and/or stereotyped views of cultural groups, it was appropriate here due to the 
exploratory nature of pilot testing. In fact, lending initial empirical validity to previously 
unresearched or unsupported notions is a principal function of pilot testing.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Participants in the pilot study were undergraduate 
psychology majors at a large four-year university. A total of N = 2123 participated in the 
study (53% female, 56% white, Mage = 18.79). The sample included 812 self-identified 
Democrats, 507 Republicans, 992 Christians (including 458 Catholics), and 1131 non-
Christians (including 267 Atheists). 
Participants were recruited through the department of psychology SONA system, 
and participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The study was administered in 
electronic survey form using the Qualtrics program. The survey consisted of demographic 
questions (many of which served as indicators of cultural membership) including 
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religious and political affiliation, short decision scenarios, and religious and political 
centrality scales, in that order. 
Measures. 
Decision tasks. Ten decision-making items were included in the pilot, each 
representing a theoretically plausible issue on which the Christian and democrat, or 
Christian and republican, cultures might diverge. The questions were accompanied by a 
slide bar for the participant to indicate their choice. The slide bar ranged from 1 to 7, with 
the ends of the spectrum representing opposing positions on an underlying issue. The 
slide bar started in the neutral position (i.e., 4), forcing participants to move in one 
direction or the other, yielding a binary choice but offering the added information of a 
continuous variable.  
The questions were worded in such a way that people could indicate the extent to 
which they supported a choice, or the likelihood that they would make choice. Certain 
decision items were intended to get at Christian/republican cultural differences in beliefs 
or values. For example, to tap into the value of forgiveness versus retaliation when 
wronged, one decision item asks: “A coworker has done something unfair or harmful to 
you at work - how likely are to want to get even with that person versus just forgive 
them?” Other decision items were intended to get at Christian/democrat cultural 
differences in beliefs or values. For example, to tap into the value of traditionalism, one 
decision item asks: “You are given a great deal of freedom in dress code at work - what is 
the likelihood that you will choose to dress in more professional/traditional way versus a 
more causal way?” 
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Included among these was the item that was eventually chosen, which was: “To 
what extent do you support traditional men's and women's restrooms versus gender-
neutral restrooms?” The response scale for the item ranged from 1 (Traditional) to 7 
(Gender-neutral). This item was chosen from among the ten included in the pilot solely 
because it was the best option statistically. That is, members of Christian and democrat 
cultures favored opposing ends of that issue and do so with a greater spread than do either 
religious/political combination for any other item included. 
Centrality. Cultural identity centrality (for both religious and political centrality) 
was measured using an adapted version of the Centrality sub-scale of Multidimensional 
Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1997). 
The centrality subscale (Appendix A) of the MIBI was developed specifically to measure 
stable (across situations) racial identity salience from the perspective of Identity Theory 
(Stryker, 1968). It consists of 8 items (e.g., In general, being Black is an important part of 
my self-image; I have a strong sense of belonging to Black people, etc.) and is scored on 
Likert agreement response scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
The scale showed high levels of internal consistency reliability with both Black ( = .75) 
and White ( = .78) samples. In the pilot study, internal consistency reliability was again 
high with both Christian ( = .81) and democrat ( = .87) groups. The pilot study also 
adapts the scale to use language that is specific to the cultures in question (e.g., In 
general, being a member of my religious group is an important part of my self-image; I 
have a strong sense of belonging to my religious group). 
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Results 
 A pilot study tested the effect of religious and political group membership and 
centrality on several decision tasks thought to be relevant to the values, beliefs, etc., 
underlying those cultures. This study was exploratory, with the goal of identifying a 
single item that could be later used as the focal DV in the main study. Results indicated 
that a decision item that measured preference for traditional (i.e., men’s and women’s) 
versus gender-neutral restrooms was the most statistically viable option from among the 
decision items used. This item was intended to capture the cultural value of traditionalism 
(or change aversion) and was embedded into a timely, real-world issue. Past research has 
indicated that change aversion is an issue on which the highly religious and the politically 
left (or liberal, in a modern political sense of the word) differ (Malka et al., 2012). That 
is, the highly religious tend to support traditionalism and are generally change averse, and 
the political left tend to be the opposite. Obviously, there will be exceptions to this. 
However, it was expected that this might be especially true with regard to gender roles, 
and on this particular social/organizational issue. The pilot data confirmed this 
expectation. 
Members of the Christian and democrat cultural groups support opposite ends of 
traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms, as indicated by the pilot data. This 
conclusion was established by the collective results of three tests: First, a dichotomous 
variable was created for democrat and republican group membership, and another for 
atheist and Christian group membership (from the religion and political group 
demographic questions which each contained several response options). These two 
dichotomous variables were then correlated with the Restroom Decision (Table 1). 
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Results show that being Christian (rather than atheist) is significantly correlated with 
support for traditional restrooms (r = -.20, p < .001), and being democrat (rather than 
republican) is significantly correlated with support for gender-neutral restrooms (r = .51, 
p < .001). 
Second, an ANOVA was conducted to examine means of each of four religious-
political group combinations. Means for democrat-Christian (M = 4.13, SD = 2.06), 
democrat-atheist (M = 4.92, SD = 1.99), republican-Christian (M = 1.88, SD = 1.71), and 
republican-atheist (M = 3.32, SD = 2.11) were compared. Multiple comparisons (i.e., 
Tukey) reveal significant support for the effect of being Christian on support for 
traditional restrooms, and the effect of being democrat on support for gender-neutral 
restrooms (see Table 2).  
A factorial 2 (atheist/Christian) × 2 (democrat/republican) ANOVA was then 
conducted to test for a potential interaction effect. Results of the factorial ANOVA 
yielded identical means as the initial ANOVA. They also confirmed a main effect of 
being democrat (as opposed to republican) on the restroom decision, such that democrats 
prefer gender-neutral restrooms to traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; F (1, 355) = 
55.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Finally, they confirmed a main effect of being Christian (as 
opposed to atheist) on the restroom decision, such that Christians prefer traditional 
restrooms to gender-neutral restrooms; F (1, 355) = 18.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. There was 
not a significant interaction between the atheist/Christian and democrat/republican; F (1, 
355) = 1.59, p = .21, ηp2 = .00 (see Table 3). 
Third, a multiple regression analysis was conducted to examine whether Christian 
Centrality and Democrat Centrality significantly predict responses to the Restroom 
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Decision. Results show that Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality significantly 
predict, in opposite directions, how likely one is to support traditional versus gender-
neutral restrooms. Christian Centrality significantly predicted support for traditional 
restrooms; B = -.38, p < .001. Democrat centrality significantly predicted support for 
gender-neutral restrooms; B = .55, p < .001. The model as a whole was significant; F (2, 
313) = 30.81, p < .001, with R2 indicating that 17% of the variance in in the Restroom 
Decision is accounted for by Christian and Democrat Centrality (see Table 4).  
Power Analysis 
 A power analysis was conducted using G-power software to establish the sample 
size required to detect the expected effect(s) and guard against Type II error in the main 
study, which involved both multiple regression analysis and then 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs for 
interpretation/visualization. Required samples size was calculated for both regression and 
factorial ANOVA analyses. Regression analysis in the main study involved three 
between-subjects factors: Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality and Situation 
Strength (i.e., an experimental manipulation – weak versus strong democrat salience 
situation). The factors were then manipulated for the ANOVAs as follows: Christian 
Centrality was dichotomized (high/low); Democrat Centrality was dichotomized 
(high/low). Centrality variables were split at the scale mid-point (i.e., 4 on 1-7 scale) 
rather than the median because there is theoretical value to establishing the groups based 
on being above or below ‘neutral’ on such a measure. 
First it was necessary to decide what effect sizes could be expected. In instances 
such as these, it is customary to rely on effect sizes in similar research to guide 
expectations in current research, or to use one’s own data if possible. Data from the pilot 
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study was used to establish (1) the effect of Democratic Centrality on the Restroom 
Decision (d = .99), and (2) the effect of Christian Centrality on the Restroom Decision (d 
= .68). These values represent medium to large effects.  
Regarding the effect of the Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision, research 
on the effect of strong (versus weak) situations indicates that one can expect a medium to 
large effect (i.e., Cohen's f 2 ranging from .17 to .42) of a strong situation on behavior 
(Meyer et al., 2014). Based on these collective effect sizes, it was reasonable to plan the 
power analysis around the ability to detect a medium effect. For multiple regression, 
calculations reveal that, at power of .8, a sample of 77 is needed in order to detect a 
medium effect. For a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial ANOVA, calculations reveal that, at power of .8, 
a sample of 128 is needed in order to detect a medium effect.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MAIN STUDY 
The main study experimentally assessed how the centrality of incongruent cultural 
identities interact in an ambiguous decision-making scenario, and whether and how 
situational salience of varying strengths influenced these effects. All hypotheses were 
tested in this study.  
Method 
Participants. Participants in the main study were a combination of undergraduate 
psychology majors at a large, four-year university and Mturk participants. A total of 328 
Christian-democrats took the survey. Roughly one-third of participants were randomly 
assigned into a control condition which was not used in the testing of hypotheses, 
yielding a final N of 239 (64% male, 60% white, Mage = 35; for full descriptive statistics 
see Table 5).   
Design and Procedure. The main study first employed a correlational design to 
test hypotheses using variables in their original, continuous state. It then tested an 
experimental 2 (Christian Centrality: high vs. low) × 2 (Democrat Centrality: high vs. 
low) × 2 (Situation Strength: weak vs. strong democrat situation) factorial ANOVA to 
provide additional information and to interpret and visualize the effects.  
A survey was created using online survey creation software (Qualtrics) and 
administered electronically. Participants were randomized to levels of the Situation 
Strength factor. The Christian and Democrat factors were based on self-reports of 
participants. Participants were recruited in two ways: (1) through the psychology research 
participation system (SONA) at the university, and (2) through Amazon.com’s 
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Mechanical Turk (Mturk). University students took the survey in exchange for course 
credit. 
Because concerns have been raised regarding the reliability of data collected from 
Mturk workers recently, several extra measures were taken to ensure that the sample and 
data were of the highest quality possible. First, the study was set up and launched through 
TurkPrime, which allows researchers to screen participants for certain criteria. The 
current research needed members of the Christian and democrat groups, and it was 
important that participants were honest about those group memberships. TurkPrime has 
the ability to only allow workers who have consistently identified as being members of 
certain demographic categories to meet the screening criteria for new studies. Therefore, 
the current research was not just relying on responses to its own political and religious 
demographic questions to establish group membership. 
The threshold for ‘worker quality rating’ was set at 95% for the current research, 
which is higher than the default threshold, and better ensures responsible and attentive 
participants. Furthermore, two steps were taken to guard against the survey being taken 
by robots. The first was a Captcha checkbox built into the survey, which uses a 
proprietary method of detecting human versus robot mouse movements. The second was 
a randomly generated alphanumeric code that each participant was provided on the final 
page of the survey, and that needed to be entered into Mturk following completion of the 
survey. Finally, Mturk now has the ability to flag workers who have taken a survey from 
the same exact geographical location, or from the same IP address, as another worker in 
the survey.  
 
 
37 
 
In the survey, participants first answered a series of demographic questions, 
including religious and political affiliation. They then were randomly assigned to one of 
two experimental conditions: ‘strong’ democrat situation, and ‘weak’ democrat situation. 
Each condition was directed to a page containing a manipulation (i.e., picture of a 
democratic donkey accompanied by text unique to each condition). All participants then 
responded to the Restroom Decision item and were timed while responding.  
Next was the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), which measured how participants felt about the decision that they had 
just made on the previous item. The language in the PANAS was adapted such that their 
responses were to reflect only how they felt about the previous item (i.e., not in general). 
Finally, each participant responded to measures of Christian Centrality and Democrat 
Centrality. These two centrality measures were randomly presented so that roughly half 
of participants responded to each one first. The last page contained a robot catch item. 
Participants were then debriefed, given a randomly generated code to enter into Mturk 
(for Mturk participants only), and the responses were recorded.   
Measures and manipulations. 
Restroom decision. The decision-making item was chosen from the pilot. It read: 
“To what extent do you support traditional men's and women's restrooms versus gender-
neutral restrooms?” The question was accompanied by a slide bar for the participant to 
indicate their choice, from 1 (Traditional) to 7 (Gender-neutral).  
Decision speed. Speed of decision-making was measured by recording the time 
spent on each question. Specifically, the survey was programed to record time elapsed 
between start of question and (1) first click, (2) last click, and (3) page submit. Also 
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recorded were the number of clicks per page (which may be an indicator of mind-
changing during the process of making a decision). ‘Page submit’ was chosen as the 
timing variable for use in the main study because it is perhaps the most representative of 
when the decision is actually made. 
Decision affect.  The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et 
al., 1988) was used to measure negative and positive affect related to the restroom 
decision. The PANAS (Appendix B) includes ten positive (e.g., happy, joyful, pleased) 
and ten negative (e.g., depressed, frustrated, angry) adjectives. The extent to which 
participants “feels that way” is indicated using a response scale ranging from 1 (very 
slightly/or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The PANAS has been effective in evaluating 
positive and negative affect in the moment, day, past few days, week, past few weeks, 
year and in general (Watson et al., 1988). Cronbach’s alpha levels during initial 
validation of the measure ranged from 0.86 to 0.90 for positive affect and from 0.84 to 
0.87 for negative affect using samples of undergraduate college students.  
The instructions for the measure in the current research were slightly adapted to 
guide thinking toward the recently answered restroom decision item. That is, participants 
were instructed to “indicate the extent to which you feel this way about your answer to 
the previous question.” Internal consistency reliability for the positive affect scale in the 
current research was high ( = .91). Likewise, internal consistency reliability for the 
negative affect scale in the current research was high ( = .92). The subscales were 
combined (i.e., positive affect minus negative affect) for hypothesis testing. 
Centrality. Cultural identity centrality (i.e., Christian and Democrat) was again 
measured using an adapted version of the Centrality sub-scale of Multidimensional 
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Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI; Sellers et al., 1997). The scale (Appendix A) again 
showed high levels of internal consistency reliability with both Christian ( = .92) and 
democrat ( = .90) groups. Like the pilot study, the main study adapted the scale to use 
language that is specific to the cultures in question, however, because I knew the 
religious and political group membership of all participants in the main study, that, more 
specific, language was used (e.g., In general, being Christian is an important part of my 
self-image; I have a strong sense of belonging to my Christian group).  
(Weak) democrat situation condition. The weak situation condition (Appendix C) 
consisted of a picture of a cultural icons (the democratic donkey symbol, accompanied by 
the word ‘Democrat’) that was shown to the participants just prior to the Restroom 
Decision item. The picture was part of a page containing the following text: 
ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: The following several pages will contain some 
decision scenarios. Please answer as honestly as possible. Please click the 'next' 
arrow to continue with the survey. 
This manipulation (i.e., using a picture of a cultural icon) is an adaptation of one 
used in work on frame switching in social psychology (see Hong et al., 2000). However, 
it technically constitutes a weak situation that makes salient one’s cultural identity, in that 
it is relatively devoid of social pressures to conform to cultural norms or expectations, or 
to publicly demonstrate loyalty to one’s group or culture.  
‘Strong’ democrat situation condition. The strong situation condition (Appendix 
D) was created by making people believe that there is a possibility that they will be 
discussing their answers to the decision items in a focus group consisting of other 
democrats. The text read: 
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ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: You have been randomly selected to participate 
in an online focus group with other self-identified Democrats. In the focus 
group, you will be discussing your answers to the questions on the next 
several pages. If you choose to participate, your personal information (including 
your name) will be entirely confidential and you will be compensated. There will 
be an opportunity at the end of the survey to indicate whether you would like to 
be contacted for participation in this focus group. Please click the 'next' arrow to 
continue with the survey. 
 According to classic theory regarding the effect of strong versus weak situations 
(see Mischel, 1977), the expression of personal dispositions is inhibited in situations that 
exert a strong pressure to behave in a certain way. Behavior is more likely to reflect 
personality or person-level factors when the demand for socially acceptable behavior is 
weak, and weak situations afford people more latitude in their behavioral choice than do 
situations more laden with social pressure. Empirical work in social psychology has 
evidenced the moderating effect that situation strength has on the relationship between 
personal disposition and behavior (see Withey, Gellatly, & Annett, 2005). 
This scenario constituted a strong situation that made salient one’s democrat 
identity. Because the participant was told that they might be sharing their answers with a 
democrat in-group, there was situational pressure to answer the restroom decision 
question in a manner consistent with democrat cultural values. Though the participant did 
not actually see or hear how other ‘participants’ responded, they would have anticipated 
their answers being judged by their fellow cultural group members, which created an in-
the-moment strong social pressure.  
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Restroom picturing covariate. The Restroom Decision item is meant to tap into 
the cultural value of traditionalism or change aversion. The question intentionally does 
not show, or describe in detail, what exactly a gender-neutral bathroom looks like 
because the goal is for the participants to be concerned with the underlying cultural value 
(tradition or change), not on the characteristics of the room itself. However, because of 
this, there is the potential for between-group differences in what a ‘gender-neutral’ room 
looks like to underlie an effect of centrality (either Christian or Democrat) on the DV in 
addition to, or instead of, traditionalism. It is not expected that this is the case, as there is 
no theoretical reason why democrats and Christians would picture this restroom 
differently. Nevertheless, differences in in how the gender-neutral restroom is pictured or 
thought of may have an effect on the DV and should thus be controlled for.  
The Restroom Decision item was piloted to solidify its appropriateness for 
inclusion in the main study, and it was important to keep it unchanged from the pilot. 
However, the main study takes the opportunity to ask participants what kind of bathroom 
they were picturing during the asking of the Restroom Decision item. The goal in doing 
this was to establish how the actual restroom in the question is being thought of. If some 
participants picture a single private room, and others picture a public room being 
simultaneously used by men and women, this would likely predict how for or against this 
option people would be, regardless of cultural values. Therefore, this was deemed an 
important part of the story, regardless of the outcome, and was statistically tested along 
with other potential covariates prior to and during the running of the main analyses.  
If Christian-democrats are divided in how they picture ‘gender-neutral,’ it can 
play out in one of two equally interesting and potentially important ways. Either, 
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Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality will predict the Restroom Decision above 
and beyond the type of bathroom pictured, which would suggest that while all predictors 
may account for variance in the Restroom Decision, how the bathroom is being pictured 
is not a function of cultural membership and/or values. Or, Christian and Democrat 
Centrality will not predict above and beyond bathroom type pictured, in which case a 
very interesting potential mediator has been uncovered. That is, it might be in that case 
that the degree to which one’s cultural identity is central influences how they think of and 
perceive ambiguous elements of their environments (e.g., ‘gender-neutral’ restrooms). 
Results 
 For clarity, variable names for the main study and beyond are explained here. The 
dependent or outcome variables in the main study were: (1) Restroom Decision – the 
focal decision-making item where participants were asked to rate the degree to which 
they support traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms; (2) Decision Speed – the time it 
took them to respond to that item; (3) Decision Affect– how they felt about their response 
to the item. 
 Independent or predictor variables for the main study were: (1) Christian 
Centrality; (2) Democrat Centrality; (3) Situation Strength.  
 Covariates analyzed in the main study were: (1) Age; (2) Sex; (3) Restroom 
Picturing – whether the restroom was pictured as a single, private room or as a public 
room simultaneously shared by men and women. 
Preliminary analysis. A preliminary multiple regression was run in order to lay 
the foundation for the main hypothesis testing. Specifically, it was important to confirm 
(i.e., replicate from the pilot study) that Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality do 
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in fact predict the Restroom Decision before any potential interaction or experimental 
effects are tested. This was accomplished by regressing the continuous Restroom 
Decision on the two continuous centrality variables. Additionally, it was appropriate to 
use this opportunity to test whether any theoretically plausible covariates account for any 
variance in the DV.  
 A hierarchical multiple regression was run to assess whether the Christian 
Centrality and Democrat Centrality predict the Restroom Decision above and beyond a 
series of theoretically plausible covariates. Specifically, Age, Sex, and Restroom 
Picturing (i.e., whether the restroom was pictured as a single, private room or as a public 
room shared by men and women) were identified as potential confounders to the 
relationship between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality and the Restroom 
Decision. These three covariates were entered into block 1 of a hierarchical multiple 
regression, and Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality were entered into block 2. 
All assumptions for multiple regression were tested and met prior to, or during, the 
running of the analysis.  
 Model 1, which included the three covariates (Age, Sex, & Restroom Picturing), 
significantly accounted for variance in Rest; F (3, 280) = 8.56, p < .001. R2 indicates that 
roughly 8% of the variance in the Restroom Decision is accounted for by the covariates. 
However, while Age (B = -.02, p < .05) and Restroom Picturing (B = -1.22, p < .001) 
each significantly account for variance in the Restroom Decision, Sex (B = .12, p = .64) 
does not. This indicates that while Sex was a theoretically plausible covariate, the 
statistics do not support it as such, and it can be excluded as a covariate in hypothesis 
testing. 
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Model 2, which included the main predictors Christian Centrality and Democrat 
Centrality along with the covariates Age, Sex, and Restroom Picturing from model 1, also 
significantly accounted for variance in the Restroom Decision; F (5, 278) = 11.15, p < 
.001. R2 indicates that roughly 17% of the variance in the Restroom Decision is 
accounted for by these five predictors together. The addition of Christian Centrality and 
Democrat Centrality at step 2 significantly increased the amount of variance accounted 
for in the Restroom Decision,  R2 = .08, Finc (2, 278) = 13.86, p < .001. Additionally, 
Christian Centrality (B = -.32, p < .001) and Democrat Centrality (B = .36, p < .001) each 
significantly account for unique variance in the Restroom Decision (see Table 6). 
In addition to testing Age and Restroom Picturing as potential covariates, it was 
important to examine whether any interactions may be occurring between them and the 
Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality predictors. Centrality variables were 
centered (?̅? − 𝑥), and interaction terms were created with each of them and each of the 
covariates (i.e., Christian Centrality × Age, Christian Centrality × Restroom Picturing, 
Democrat Centrality × Age, Democrat Centrality × Restroom Picturing). Regression 
analyses indicate that neither Age nor Restroom Picturing is interacting with either of the 
centrality variables in predicting the Restroom Decision. 
Due to these findings, Age and Restroom Picturing, but not Sex, are later 
controlled for in regression analyses with the Restroom Decision and included as 
covariates in the subsequent factorial ANCOVA analysis. Importantly, these are only 
covariates for the testing of the Restroom Decision DV. There is not a theoretical or 
statistical basis for including them as covariates in the main Decision Speed or Decision 
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Affect analyses. Furthermore, they did not significantly account for variance in those 
DVs when tested in regression.  
 Missing data. There was no missing data in this study. This is perhaps in part 
attributable to the fact that the sample consisted of high-quality, well-compensated 
participants recruited specifically because they belonged to the necessary groups (i.e., 
democrat and Christian). Additionally, most of the variables used in the analyses had 
forced responses in the survey. Importantly, however, it was made clear that participants 
could opt out at any time during the survey. 
Outliers. Outliers were identified by examining z-scores and boxplots. Outliers 
were handled on a by-analysis basis (i.e., if the variables included contained outlying 
cases, those cases were excluded). The proper handling of outliers was particularly 
important for the Decision Speed DV because participants might take long pauses or 
become distracted during that item, causing delayed responding and skewed data. It 
would have helped the sample size to keep those cases and simply reduce their score to 
within the normal range. However, because time delays of this nature are not necessarily 
indicative of slow decision-making for the predicted reasons (i.e., identity conflict), those 
case were excluded from their respective analyses. 
Decision rules. Three out of eight of the items in the centrality scale (used to 
measure both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality) are reverse worded and 
scored. Because of this, the scale can act as a ‘catch question.’ A participant who is 
responding with 6s and 7s to the positively coded items should, in theory, respond with 
1s and 2s for the negatively coded ones. However, there were several instances of 
participants responding with 6s and 7s across the board (or 1s and 2s). Cases where a 
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single number is given for every centrality item for either Christian Centrality or 
Democrat Centrality were identified as potentially problematic. All analyses were run 
with and without these cases. There were no meaningful differences in the results when 
the problematic cases were excluded, therefore all results below are presented with all 
cases (i.e., no exclusions). 
Centrality variables were dichotomized to allow for factorial ANOVA analyses (2 
× 2 × 2). While it is common to perform a median split in these instances, it was decided 
that, due to the nature of the centrality variable and scale, the mid-point of the scale (i.e., 
‘4’ on a 1 to 7 scale) would be an appropriate dividing point. Incidentally, the median for 
each of these scales was within .20 of the scale mid-point, therefore group sizes (i.e., high 
and low) are roughly equal for both Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality.  
Hypothesis testing. Main study hypothesis testing consisted of a series of 
multiple regressions using grouped data; one regression analysis for each of the three 
DVs. The dependent variables in this study again were: (1) Restroom Decision – the focal 
decision-making item where participants were asked to rate the degree to which they 
support traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms; (2) Decision Speed – the time it took 
them to respond to that item; (3) Decision Affect – how they felt about their response to 
the item. Specifically, continuous predictors (i.e., Christian Centrality and Democrat 
Centrality) were centered by subtracting the mean from each case, and the binary 
predictor (i.e., Situation Strength) was coded as -1 and 1. Interaction terms were then 
created for all combinations of Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation 
Strength (i.e., three two-way interactions and one three-way interaction). All predictors 
and interaction terms were entered into a multiple regression model. Additionally, for the 
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Restroom Decision analysis, a hierarchical multiple regression was performed to account 
for the effect of two covariates; Age and Restroom Picturing (i.e., how the gender-neutral 
restroom was pictured by participants). The covariates were entered in block one, and all 
predictors and interaction terms in block 2. 
Next, to provided additional information and a method of interpretation, a series 
of factorial ANOVAs were conducted; one for each of the three dependent variables. The 
design for each of the three analyses was 2 (Christian Centrality: high vs. low) × 2 
(Democrat Centrality: high vs. low) × 2 (Situation Strength: weak vs. strong democratic 
situation). Additionally, for the Restroom Decision analysis, an ANCOVA was 
performed in order to account for the effect of two covariates; Age and Restroom 
Picturing. A Bonferroni adjustment was applied to all analyses to account for the increase 
in Type I error that can be expected when there is a high number of hypotheses per 
analysis/data set (i.e., the probability of finding a statistically significant effect goes up 
with the number of hypotheses). This adjustment multiplies the p-value of each F statistic 
by the number of predictors in the model while leaving the alpha at the traditional .05 
level. Assumptions of ANOVA/ANCOVA were tested prior to, or during, the running of 
each analysis, and were all met.  
Restroom Decision analysis (H1a & b). A hierarchical multiple regression was 
conducted to determine the main and interaction effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat 
Centrality, and Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision when controlling for Age 
and Restroom Picturing. It was predicted that there would be main effects for all three 
IVs in the model (Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, and Situation Strength), as 
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well as a two-way interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Situation Strength 
on the Restroom Decision.  
Model 1, which included the two covariates (Age and Restroom Picturing), 
significantly accounted for variance in the Restroom Decision; F (2, 197) = 8.85, p < 
.001. R2 indicates that roughly 8% of the variance in the Restroom Decision is accounted 
for by the covariates. Additionally, Age (B = -.03, p < .01) and Restroom Picturing (B = -
.94, p < .01) each significantly account for unique variance in the Restroom Decision.  
Model 2 included the main predictors Christian Centrality, Democrat Centrality, 
and Situation Strength, and all interaction terms, along with the covariates Age and 
Restroom Picturing from model 1. Model 2 also significantly accounted for variance in 
the Restroom Decision; F (9, 190) = 5.80, p < .001. R2 indicates that roughly 21% of the 
variance in the Restroom Decision is accounted for by the model. The addition of the 
predictors and interaction terms at step 2 significantly increased the amount of variance 
accounted for in the Restroom Decision;  R2 = .13, Finc (7, 190) = 4.60, p < .001.  
Additionally, Christian Centrality (B = -.31, p < .01) and Democrat Centrality (B 
= .36, p < .01) each significantly account for unique variance in the Restroom Decision. 
Specifically, Christian Centrality negatively predicted the decision (indicating support for 
traditional restrooms) and Democrat Centrality positively predicted the decision 
(indicating support for gender-neutral restrooms). Neither Situation Strength nor any of 
the interaction terms significantly accounted for unique variance in the Restroom 
Decision. These results provide partial support for hypothesis 1a; both Christian 
Centrality and Democrat Centrality significantly predicted the Restroom Decision, but 
Situation Strength did not (B = -.17, p = .22). Support for hypothesis 1b was not found; 
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the interaction term Christian Centrality × Situation Strength did not significantly predict 
the Restroom Decision (B = .05, p = .58).  
A 2 × 2 × 2 analysis of covariance was then conducted to interpret these findings 
and confirm whether they hold with dichotomized centrality variables. ANCOVA results 
(see Table 7) confirm a significant effect for the covariate Age, F (1, 173) = 8.80, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .05, and a significant effect for the covariate Restroom Picturing, F (1, 173) = 
4.98, p < .05, ηp2 = .03. Additionally, there was again a significant main effect of 
Christian Centrality, F (1, 173) = 8.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, and a significant main effect 
of Democrat Centrality, F (1, 173) = 6.39, p < .05, ηp2 = .04, after accounting for the 
effect of the covariates. There were no other significant main or interaction effects. See 
Tables 8 and 9 for adjusted means, standard errors and confidence intervals. See Figures 
1, 2, and 3 for group mean bar charts. 
Decision Speed analysis (H2a & b). A hierarchical multiple regression was 
conducted to determine the main and interaction effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat 
Centrality, and Situation Strength on Decision Speed. It was predicted that there would 
be a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Speed, as well as a two-way 
interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision 
Speed. 
The model included the main predictors Christian Centrality, Democrat 
Centrality, and Situation Strength, and all interaction terms. The model as a whole did not 
significantly account for variance in Decision Speed; F (7, 177) = .39, p = .91. R2 
indicates that roughly 2% of the variance in Decision Speed is accounted for by the 
model. Additionally, no individual predictor or interaction term significantly accounted 
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for unique variance in Decision Speed. The results thus provided no support for 
hypotheses 2a and b. Neither Situation Strength (B = .11, p = .68) nor the Christian 
Centrality × Democrat Centrality interaction term (B = -.06, p = .59) significantly 
predicted Decision Speed. 
A 2 × 2 × 2 analysis of variance was then conducted to interpret these findings 
and confirm whether they hold with dichotomized centrality variables. ANOVA results 
(see Table 10) confirm no significant effects. See Table 11 for means, standard errors and 
confidence intervals. See Figures 4 and 5 for group mean bar charts. 
Decision Affect analysis (H3a & b). A hierarchical multiple regression was 
conducted to determine the main and interaction effects of Christian Centrality, Democrat 
Centrality, and Situation Strength on Decision Affect. It was predicted that there would 
be a main effect of Situation Strength on Decision Affect, as well as a two-way 
interaction effect between Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision 
Affect. 
The model included the main predictors Christian Centrality, Democrat 
Centrality, and Situation Strength, and all interaction terms. The model as a whole 
significantly accounted for variance in Decision Affect; F (7, 230) = 3.27, p < .01. R2 
indicates that roughly 9% of the variance in Decision Affect is accounted for by the 
model. Additionally, Democrat Centrality (B = .21, p < .001) and the Christian Centrality 
× Democrat Centrality interaction term (B = .08, p < .05) each significantly account for 
unique variance in Decision Affect. No other predictor or interaction term accounted for 
variance in Decision Affect. These results fail to provide support for hypothesis 3a; 
Situation Strength did not significantly predict Decision Affect (B = .01, p = .92). The 
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results do provide support for hypothesis 3b in that the interaction term Christian 
Centrality × Democrat Centrality did significantly predict Decision Affect.  
A 2 × 2 × 2 analysis of variance was then conducted to interpret these findings 
and confirm whether they hold with dichotomized centrality variables. ANOVA results 
(see Table 12) confirm a significant main effect of Democrat Centrality, F (1, 207) = 
8.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, and a significant interaction effect of Christian Centrality and 
Democrat Centrality, F (1, 207) = 5.03, p < .05, ηp2 = .02. In the low Christian Centrality 
group, both high (M = 1.16, SE = .17) and low (M = 1.06, SE = .15) Democrat Centrality 
groups are roughly equal (and not significantly different from one another) in Decision 
Affect, with scores indicating that they are in positive affect territory (each scoring near 
1, with 0 representing neutral affect).  
However, in the high Christian Centrality group, positive affect goes down for 
those low in Democrat Centrality (M = .83, SE = .15), and up for those high in Democrat 
Centrality (M = 1.50, SE = .14); and these groups are significantly different from one 
another in Decision Affect. There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
See Tables 13 and 14 for means, standard errors and confidence intervals. See Figures 6, 
7, and 8 for group mean bar charts. 
Post hoc analyses. In addition to hypothesis testing, it was beneficial to run 
certain post hoc analyses that could further illuminate these findings. First, testing the 
main hypotheses in multiple regression allowed for the testing of non-linear relationships 
between the predictor and outcome variables. This was done by visually examining 
scatterplots and fitting linear, quadratic, and cubic lines to the data for all predictor-
outcome relationships. Potential non-linear relationships were then tested in hierarchical 
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multiple regression for significance and magnitude of unique effect by squaring (or 
cubing in the case of cubic relationships) the predictor term and entering it into the model 
at step 2.  
It was found that Christian Centrality has a significant quadratic relationship with 
Decision Affect; F (2, 236) = 6.10, p < .01. R2 indicates that roughly 5% of the variance 
in Decision Affect is accounted for by the model. The addition of squared Christian 
Centrality term at step 2 significantly increased the amount of variance accounted for in 
Decision Affect,   R2 = .05, Finc (1, 236) = 12.10, p < .01. Those high and low in 
Christian Centrality felt more positively about their answers to the Restroom Decision 
than did those with middle levels of Christian Centrality. Or, stated differently, the 
regression slope is negative from low centrality to middle centrality, and positive from 
middle centrality to high centrality (see Figure 9). 
Second, because certain of the PANAS items are particularly pertinent to the 
feelings that might be associated with cultural identity conflict in decision-making, it was 
worth testing them as individual dependent variables. Of course, being single items (as 
opposed to scales), these results should be interpreted cautiously, and it is suggested that 
they serve as preliminary evidence for future research that can employ more rigorous 
methods. 
A series of 2 (Christian Centrality: high vs. low) × 2 (Democrat Centrality: high 
vs. low) factorial ANOVAs were conducted with each of the individual items of the 
PANAS as dependent variables. While there was a main effect of either Christian 
Centrality or Democrat Centrality on several items, the only item for which a significant 
interaction emerged was the positive affect item, ‘Attentive.’ As would be expected, 
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those high in centrality for both cultures were more attentive to the Restroom Decision 
question than were those high in centrality for one and low in the other and those low in 
centrality for both; F (1, 212) = 4.00, p < .05, ηp2 = .02. See Table 15 for group means 
and Figure 10 for bar charts. While there was not a significant interaction effect on any 
other single PANAS item, both ‘Proud’ and ‘Guilty’ were trending towards significance 
(p < .10). 
Additionally, it was sensible to test these same effects as a three-way interaction 
with a dichotomized Restroom Decision variable. That is, it was important to determine 
whether the direction of the response to the focal decision DV (i.e., whether the person 
chose to support traditional versus gender-neutral restrooms) interacted with their 
Christian and/or Democrat Centrality in determining how they felt about their decision. 
Though there was a main effect of the dichotomized restroom decision DV on several of 
the individual PANAS items, there was no two- or three-way interaction between it and 
the two centrality variables.  
Nonlinear relationships between Democrat Centrality/Christian Centrality and 
each of the individual PANAS items were also tested. Results show that Christian 
Centrality has a quadratic relationship with the positive affect items ‘Interested’ (B = .08, 
p < .01, R2 Quadratic = .03), ‘Enthusiastic’ (B = .09, p < .01, R2 Quadratic = .03), ‘Alert’ 
(B = .09, p < .05, R2 Quadratic = .04), ‘Inspired’ (B = .09, p < .05, R2 Quadratic = .03), 
‘Determined’ (B = .09, p < .05, R2 Quadratic = .02), and ‘Attentive’ (B = .08, p < .05, R2 
Quadratic = .03), as well as negative affect item ‘Scared’ (B = -.05, p < .05, R2 Quadratic 
= .02). Additionally, results show that Democrat Centrality has a quadratic relationship 
with positive affect items ‘Enthusiastic’ (B = .08, p < .05, R2 Quadratic = .06), ‘Alert’ (B 
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= .12, p < .01, R2 Quadratic = .05), and ‘Attentive’ (B = .09, p < .05, R2 Quadratic = .03), 
as well as negative affect item ‘Guilty’ (B = -.05, p < .05, R2 Quadratic = .02). 
All quadratic relationships are positive with positive affect items and mirror the 
pattern of the relationship between Christian Centrality and Decision Affect (Figure 9). 
That is, positive affect decreases from low to middle centrality, and increases from 
middle to high centrality. Which essentially means that people feel more positively about 
the decision and underlying issue at low and high levels of centrality than at middle 
levels. The only negative quadratic relationships were between Democrat Centrality and 
‘Guilty,’ and between Christian Centrality and ‘Scared.’ For these, positive affect 
increased from low to middle levels of centrality and decreased from middle to high 
levels. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The first of three questions asked in the current research was, ‘do people make 
decisions in a manner consistent with cultural identity centrality?’ Results of the current 
research suggest that they do. This question was foundational (i.e., not a novel aspect of 
the research); it was not hypothesized about, but it was necessary to establish this as a 
basis for the hypotheses that were made. Results of both the pilot study and the main 
study show that Christian centrality predicts support for traditional restrooms and 
Democrat Centrality predicts support for gender-neutral restrooms. 
The second asked, ‘how do two incongruent cultural identities interact to 
influence decision-making?’ Results of the current research suggest that they interact to 
affect the emotion related to the decision, such that having high Christian and high 
Democrat Centrality leads to significantly higher decision-related positive affect than all 
other group combinations (though upon further analysis, this effect appears to be driven 
by attentiveness to the decision task). This question was addressed by examining the two-
way interactions between Christian and Democrat Centrality with each of the three 
decision-making DVs.  
The third asked, ‘does situational strength (of situations that make salient a 
cultural identity) influence decision-making, or interact with conflicting cultural 
centrality in doing so?’ Results of the current research suggest that strong situations did 
not affect decision-making, and that cultural identity centrality was resistant to the effects 
of the strong situation. However, there are many theoretical and methodological 
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considerations associated with these findings, which are discussed in detail in the sections 
that follow. 
Summary and Interpretation of Results 
The results of the main study provided support for some but not all of the 
predictions that were made. There were main effects of Christian Centrality and 
Democrat Centrality, but no main effect of Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision 
(H1a). Additionally, there was no interaction effect of Christian Centrality and Situation 
Strength on the Restroom Decision (H1b). There was no main effect of Situation Strength 
on Decision Speed (H2a) nor was there an interaction effect of Christian Centrality and 
Democrat Centrality on Decision Speed (H2b). There was no main effect of Situation 
Strength on Decision Affect (H3a), however, there was an interaction effect of Christian 
Centrality and Democrat Centrality on Decision Affect (H3b). Additionally, post hoc 
analyses revealed a significant nonlinear (i.e., quadratic) relationship between Christian 
Centrality and Decision Affect, as well as a significant interaction effect of Christian 
Centrality and Democrat Centrality on the PANAS item ‘Attentive.’ 
All results, regardless of whether they surpassed thresholds of statistical 
significance, are worthy of interpretation and should be seen as being potentially 
important to the literature and relevant theory. This section will discuss and interpret the 
results of the hypothesis testing by dependent variable. It will then interpret results from 
the post hoc analyses and discuss their relationship to the predictions and the larger 
theoretical picture.  
Restroom Decision. The results of multiple regression and ANCOVA analyses 
collectively show a main effect of Christian Centrality on support for traditional (men’s 
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and women’s) restrooms and a main effect of Democrat Centrality on support for gender-
neutral restrooms after controlling for the effect of age (i.e., younger participants 
supported gender-neutral rooms) and Restroom Picturing (those who pictured the gender-
neutral room as a single-use, locking room supported gender-neutral rooms). This finding 
replicated the same finding from the pilot study which was used as part of a suite of 
evidence that Democrat and Christian culture do in fact support opposing ends of this 
decision scenario (and the values underlying it).  
Importantly, what was established by this finding was that the proclivity to make 
decisions that verify a cultural identity goes beyond just membership in that culture. It 
involves the degree to which that cultural identity is central to the overall self-concept. 
All participants in the main study were members of both the Democrat and Christian 
cultures, meaning all participants violated the values of at least one of their cultural 
identities in making the Restroom Decision. The data show that they did so according to 
how relatively central each of those cultural identities were. 
Additionally, while the interaction of Christian Centrality and Democrat 
Centrality did not quite reach statistical significance, there was a small (and nearly 
significant) effect that is worthy of cautious interpretation. At high levels of Christian 
Centrality, people slightly supported traditional restrooms regardless of level of 
Democrat Centrality. At low levels of Christian Centrality, however, low-centrality 
Democrats still supported traditional restrooms, but high-centrality Democrats strongly 
supported gender-neutral restrooms. This raises two questions: First, why does support 
for traditional restrooms outweigh support for gender-neutral restrooms when Christian 
Centrality and Democrat Centrality are both high, or both low? In theory, these would 
 
 
58 
 
cancel one another out and lead to neutral responses. Why did they lean toward 
traditional instead of gender-neutral? Second, why was the apparently strong effect of 
Democrat Centrality restricted at high levels of Christian centrality, while the same was 
not true with reversed roles? It seems that Christian Centrality suppresses the effect of 
Democrat Centrality – but why? 
The answer to both questions may be the same - perhaps this finding, albeit 
nonsignificant, provides some insight into which of these two cultural identities (i.e., 
Christian and Democrat) is more intrinsically important to people, or least how important 
they are regarding the value of traditionalism. While the current research contends that 
the sort of intrapersonal culture conflict demonstrated here should, in theory, be the same 
for any two similarly incongruent cultures, it does not contend that all cultures are 
equally meaningful to people.  
It may be that, on average, religious cultural identities override political cultural 
identities. The data do show that Christian Centrality is significantly higher than 
Democrat Centrality among Christian-democrats in the control condition. Additionally, 
research on cultural identity prioritization using the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954) shows that religious identity is significantly more prioritized than 
political group identity across all religious and political groups (to the extent that order on 
the Twenty Statements Test indicates prioritization; Barbour & Cohen, 2019). Or it may 
be that for this particular decision, religious values suppressed conflicting political values 
because the Christian stance on traditionalism is more important to people than the 
Democrat stance. Of course, an alternative hypothesis regarding the leaning of responses 
toward traditional restrooms is that traditional restrooms were just slightly more preferred 
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by everyone, perhaps for reasons unrelated to political or religious values. Though this 
would not explain the aforementioned interaction. 
There was no effect of Situation Strength on the Restroom Decision (or any other 
DV), nor was there an interaction effect of Situation Strength and Christian Centrality. 
These results are, of course, related and can be interpreted together. The null effect of 
situation strength on the Restroom Decision is inconsistent with prior research on person 
× situation interactions in strong versus weak situations (Johns, 2006; Weiss & Adler, 
1984). Such research essentially demonstrates that when situations do not add social 
pressure to behave in a certain way, personal characteristics are free to dictate behavior 
(Meyer et al., 2014).  
In theory, the strong (Democrat) situation in the current research would have 
applied social pressure (as opposed to the intrapersonal, self-applied pressure ostensibly 
taking place in the weak situation) to choose gender-neutral restrooms. This should have 
done two things: (1) Move all responses in the strong condition in the direction of 
gender-neutral restrooms, and (2) curb the effect Christian Centrality on the decision for 
those high in Christian Centrality. This did not happen for one of several potential 
reasons. 
First, while the strong situation was strong in theory, it may not have been strong 
enough in reality. This manipulation hinged on selling that the participants may later have 
to account for or justify their responses to cultural ingroup members. The perception, or 
the imagining, of that future accountability is what should have created the in-the-
moment situational strength for them. The pressure to decide a certain way may have 
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been one step too far temporally removed from the decision itself to have the desired 
effect. 
Second, it is possible that decision-making driven by centrality is robust to the 
effects of situational salience, weak or strong. The personal and situational characteristics 
in person × situation interactions can vary quite a bit. There is likely variability in the 
extent to which personal characteristics in particular will hold with the hypothesis. 
Traditionally, they have been examined with personality constructs (e.g., the NEO-PI; 
Costa & McCrae, 1985; see Meyer et al., 2014). And while the logic of the hypothesis 
should hold with other similarly intrinsic, dispositional traits (e.g., identity centrality), 
clearly not all are equal in all ways. It may be, for example, that while extraversion may 
be suppressed by the effects of a strong situation, one’s religious identity centrality may 
not be. It is conceivable that there are differences in the extent to which these internal 
constructs matter enough to carry through to affect behavior and/or resist social 
pressures. 
Finally, it should be considered that strong situations are simply no more 
powerful than weak situations in this particular decision-making scenario. Results that are 
inconsistent with prior research do not necessarily indicate faulty methods; they may 
simply indicate the existence of a moderator. It may be that some force was at play in the 
strong situation condition that counteracted the pressure to make ‘the democrat decision’ 
for that particular decision scenario. For example, the Restroom Decision DV was, and is, 
a hot button issue in society. People may be wary of self-disclosing potentially damaging 
information even if they have reason to believe they are in the safety of an ingroup (i.e., 
like-minded people; Kenrick, Cohen, Neuberg, & Cialdini, 2018).  
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It may be that certain elements of the strong situation (e.g., pressure to conform to 
democrat values) pushed people in the direction of gender-neutral restrooms, while other 
elements pushed them back toward traditional restrooms (e.g., potential cost of self-
disclosure outweighing any potential reward). Participants knew they would need to 
defend their answers (in the later focus groups), and even in a ‘friendly’ in-group, that is 
a socially risky proposition given such a controversial question. Therefore, a more 
moderate answer (i.e., toward the middle from the gender-neutral extreme) is safer, 
especially given the unconcealable fact that focus groups would be full of multicultural 
people (i.e., not just monocultural democrats) who may have mixed views on such a 
topic. Or perhaps people think that traditional is safer. Going against the group to support 
change may seem riskier than going against the group to support maintaining the status 
quo. The same experiment with a Christian (instead of democrat) strong/weak situation 
manipulation would illuminate that for us. 
Decision Speed. Results show no main or interaction effects of Democrat 
Centrality, Christian Centrality, or Situation Strength on Decision Speed. This likely 
indicates one of three things: (1) There was no intrapersonal culture conflict taking place, 
(2) any intrapersonal culture conflict taking place simply did not translate into a 
detectably slower decision process, (3) culture conflict was present and would have led to 
a slower decision process had the decision been sufficiently consequential and/or had 
another factor (e.g., desire to finish the survey) not suppressed the effect. I feel that third 
option is most likely and discuss further below in the ‘Limitations and Future Directions’ 
section. 
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Decision Affect. Results show a main effect of Democrat Centrality and an 
interaction effect of Democrat Centrality and Christian Centrality on Decision Affect. As 
Democrat Centrality increases, positive affect increases. However, this needs to be 
considered in the context of the interaction. As stated in the results, in the low Christian 
Centrality group, both high and low Democrat Centrality groups are roughly equal (and 
not significantly different from one another) in Decision Affect, with scores indicating 
that they are in positive affect territory (each scoring near 1, with 0 representing neutral 
affect). However, in the high Christian Centrality group, positive affect goes down 
slightly for those low in Democrat Centrality, and up significantly for those high in 
Democrat Centrality. 
While the interaction of Democrat Centrality and Christian Centrality on Decision 
Affect was predicted (i.e., Hypothesis 3b), the observed interaction did not occur in the 
predicted way. According to the hypothesis, those high in both Christian Centrality and 
Democrat Centrality should have had the lowest positive affect of all group combinations 
because they would have been experiencing the most internal conflict. This would have 
been consistent with self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) as well as marketing 
research on the negative emotional states that accompany conflict-laden decisions (Luce 
1998; Luce et al., 2001). Instead, this group experienced the highest positive affect of all 
group combinations (see Figure 6).  
The most logical interpretation of this paradoxical finding is that the PANAS is a 
complex measure of emotional states, and the items in the scale vary a great deal in their 
relevance to cultural identity conflict. They need to be analyzed individually to 
deconstruct the meaning of this interaction. One would not expect a participant to be 
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‘Hostile’ due to conflicting Christian and democrat identities, for example. But perhaps 
the best example of this is the positive affect item ‘Attentive,’ on which the interaction of 
Christian and Democrat Centrality also had an effect. These results are elaborated upon 
further in the discussion of the post hoc analysis of individual PANAS items. 
PANAS items. A stated above, we would not expect all of the items of the 
PANAS to yield information that is useful to this research. For example, it would be 
unusual for one to feel ‘Jittery’ when thinking about the response that they just gave to 
the Restroom Decision item. Some, however, seem particularly relevant. For example, 
one who is not conflicted by similar levels of centrality between the two cultural 
identities might feel ‘Strong’ about their answer. One who is more conflicted (i.e., similar 
levels of centrality between the two cultural identities) might feel ‘Upset’ or ‘Guilty’ 
about their answer. This is not trivial. How a person feels about their behavior has the 
ability to affect their mood for extended periods of time, or change the likelihood of a 
future behavior.  
Post Hoc analyses reveal an interaction effect of Christian and Democrat 
Centrality on the positive affect item ‘Attentive.’ This is an important discovery for two 
reasons: (1) it is consistent with what one would expect regarding the role of cultural 
identity conflict in choice (i.e., conflicting intrapersonal guidance on the correct course of 
action would cause one to more closely attend to and consider the options), and (2) it 
explains the paradoxical finding of Decision Affect being highest for those who are high 
in both Christian and Democrat Centrality. That is, being ‘Happy’ about your decision if 
you are conflicted does not seem logical but being attentive if you are conflicted does. 
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Nonlinear relationships. While no predictions were made about potential 
nonlinear relationships between centrality variables and any DVs, regression analyses 
provided a convenient opportunity to check for these. Results of post hoc analysis of 
nonlinear relationships show that Christian Centrality has a positive quadratic 
relationship with Decision Affect. Furthermore, several of the individual PANAS items 
display the same quadratic relationship with Christian Centrality (e.g., ‘Interested,’ 
‘Inspired’), and several (but fewer) do with Democrat Centrality as well (‘Enthusiastic,’ 
‘Alert’).  
The general pattern is that at both high and low levels of centrality, positive affect 
is higher and negative affect is lower, and at middle levels of centrality, positive affect is 
lower and negative affect is higher. An interpretation of this is that people are least sure 
of who they are at middle levels of centrality, leading to greater general uncertainty and 
emotional discontent about identity relevant decisions. Conversely, those high in 
centrality know who they are and those low in centrality know who they are not (in 
theory), both of which may lead to greater confidence and emotional contentment about 
identity relevant decisions. 
Implications 
The findings of the current research carry several important implications for 
research and theory in various fields. First, biculturalism (and, in theory, 
multiculturalism) exists across, as well as within, categories of cultures. As noted in the 
introduction, while social psychology and related fields have in recent years expanded 
culture research to acknowledge increasingly more forms of culture, still too many people 
equate culture with ethnicity and cultural ethnicity with east versus west. Moreover, 
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bicultural research (e.g., Hong et al., 2010), while also expanding to include forms such 
as social class (Herrmann & Varnum, 2018), has focused on within-category 
biculturalism. The current research provides evidence of cross-category biculturalism and 
demonstrates how the identities associated with these cultures interact in decision 
scenarios relevant to the values of both (e.g., the extent to which one values 
traditionalism).  
Second, centrality of cultural identity, perhaps more than mere possession of 
cultural identity, is meaningful in understanding the effects of culture on thinking and 
behavior. The current research advances the cultural literature by taking a self-
concept/identity approach to thinking about the effect of multiple cultural memberships. 
It is not simply that we all belong to many cultures and those cultural memberships 
conflict with and complement one another to varying degrees. It is that each of those 
cultures represents an identity (i.e., the content of self), and each of those identities is 
somewhere in a chronic hierarchy of salience. Not all Christian-democrats think the same 
way; not all make decisions in the same way. Some choose one extreme end of a 
controversial and polarizing issue; some choose the other extreme end. Cultural 
psychology can benefit from a stronger appreciation of cultural identity centrality (as 
opposed to cultural membership alone). 
Third, our cultural identities interact to influence behavior and decision-making in 
subtle ways (e.g., attentiveness increases with internal conflict). The foundational finding 
that Christian Centrality predicts support for traditional restrooms and Democrat 
Centrality predicts support for gender-neutral restroom is interesting, and adds to the 
culture literature (1) evidence of how relatively important different cultural identities are, 
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and (2) how this plays out behaviorally. But these findings are consistent with existing 
research and theory in other areas (e.g., Identity Theory; Stryker, 1968). The more 
impactful findings come from how the centrality of these cultural identities interacts. 
Perhaps the most impactful implications of the current research come from the 
Decision Affect findings. The interaction of Christian and Democrat Centrality on 
positive affect related to the decision is important not only for basic research in 
psychology, but for applied research across various fields, such as marketing. This is 
particularly true given the post hoc finding with the attentiveness item. For example, it 
would benefit marketers to know that people will give greater attention to an item if it 
highlights a cultural inconsistency for cultures that are highly central.  
The quadratic relationships between both Christian and Democrat Centrality and 
the individual PANAS items are meaningful as well. A consumer who feels guilty about 
a recently purchased item of clothing (e.g., that might signal membership in a mid-
centrality cultural group) may be less likely to wear it or more likely to return it, either of 
which would have implications for the manufacturer and/or retailer. A consumer who is 
enthusiastic about a restaurant choice based on its cultural conduciveness to a high-
centrality cultural identity may spend more money than less enthusiastic patrons.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The results of the current research highlight certain limitations and areas for 
future work. One limitation was the Situation Strength manipulation. As noted above, 
while it did manipulate situation strength in theory, because the social pressure required 
imagination, and was temporally removed from the decision-making scenario itself, it 
was not as strong as it could have been and often is in the environment. The strong 
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situation may also have manipulated other closely-related constructs. For example, it may 
be that justification or accountability was being activated by the ‘strong’ condition. 
Future research can measure these and other similar constructs or take steps to make the 
manipulations as ecologically valid as possible. 
Additionally, regarding the lack of an effect of Situational Strength, it may be that 
participants held back on fully committing to democrat values in the strong situation due 
to the knowledge that others in the focus would be multicultural and hold mixed views on 
issues. Every participant in the study was democrat, but also Christian. They were 
recruited that way and were aware that others were recruited that way. They may have 
suspected that the focus group that they would later take part in would also contain 
Christian-democrats and answered more moderately as a result.  
Relatedly, participants may have been wary of self-disclosing potentially 
damaging information given the controversial subject matter of the decision-making item. 
Future research can utilize theory on relational mobility (Yuki et al., 2007) to shed light 
on the cognitive and affective states and processes of participants in similar situational 
manipulations. Research on relational mobility has shown that when people perceive that 
close relationships within a cultural group are not easily broken or formed, they are less 
likely to self-disclose personal information about themselves (Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, & 
Takemura, 2009). The logic is that, when new close relationships are hard to form, self-
disclosing potentially damaging information is risky, in that it might lead to social 
exclusion. Conversely, when new close relationships are easy to form, self-disclosing 
potentially damaging information is a way of signaling loyalty and trust to existing close 
others (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Collins & Miller, 1994; Laurenceau, Barrett, & 
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Pietromonaco, 1998). This can be a very useful construct in future research on the 
behavioral effect of conflicting cultural identities.  
Another potential limitation was that the decisions in the current research were 
not binary, nor were they categorical, but rather were continuous. One might argue that, 
because of this, the Restroom Decision was in fact not a decision-making scenario but 
rather a measure of one’s attitudes toward an issue. The current research contends that 
participants were forced to choose a direction on that item (and on similar items used in 
the pilot study), thereby making it a choice. It is acknowledged, however, that it was a 
choice clearly based on attitudes toward an issue, and that the choice itself was a 
somewhat trivial and easily measured one compared to some of the more consequential 
choices that could possibly have been measured, or that take place in the environment. It 
was not important to the current research to theoretically tease apart the attitudes from the 
decision that they led to, but because the decision was so inconsequential, it blurred the 
line between the choice being made and the attitudes underlying it. 
Future research in this area can do three things to further develop these findings 
and add rigor to the decision-making outcome: First, it can consider some of the 
cognitive and affective constructs that might be mediating the relationship between 
centrality (or situational salience) and decision-making and measure those variables. It 
might be, for example, that attitudes or certain combinations of cultural value or belief 
dimensions (e.g., power distance, masculinity; Hofstede, 2011) mediate the cultural 
identity decision-making process.  
Second, decision-making can be measured by observing behaviors as opposed to 
asking what one would decide. When a behavior is observed, there is little room to argue 
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that a choice was not made. When one is asked what choice they would make, it is more 
difficult to disentangle the reported hypothetical behavior from the attitudes that underlie 
it. Third, the decision scenarios can be as consequential to the participant as possible 
without risking harm or violating ethical guidelines. That is, if they do not believe that 
the consequences of their decision have any basis in reality, they will not put forth the 
thought and effort necessary for interpretable results.  
This final point ties into another limitation of the current research; for the 
Decision Speed DV, it was essential that the participants cared enough about their 
response for cultural identity conflict to impact the speed of their response. This was 
likely not achieved. This research, more than most, hinges on people thinking about and 
caring about how they answer. There is a strong incentive to finish a survey quickly; the 
incentive to make the ‘right’ decision on the DV item needs to be at least as strong.  
An example of a decision scenario that might seem more consequential to the 
participant is asking them to vote on a certain issue as if they were an elected official. Of 
course, truly consequential decisions involve real-world consequences for the choice 
being made. In an experimental setting, this would need to involve a high degree of 
deception. 
A potential methodological limitation of the main study was the ordering of the 
items in the survey. The ordering was thoroughly thought out, but it was necessary to 
build in certain imperfections to avoid larger, more costly errors. The order was limited in 
a least two ways: First, the IVs Christian Centrality and Democrat Centrality were 
measured after the manipulation. This allows for the possibility of the Centrality 
responses varying as a function of experimental condition. However, past theory and 
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research in Identity Theory (Stryker, 1987) has made clear that centrality is stable, and 
should be resistant to the short-term effects brought on by situational salience.  
Second, the covariate Restroom Picturing was measured after the DVs. In theory, 
a covariate should be measured prior to the measuring of a DV, which was not possible in 
this case because the covariate measure asked the participant about their response to the 
DV item. It is unlikely that this limitation had any impact on the results, but it is 
nevertheless important to mention.  
An important future direction will be to expand this research from bicultural 
intrapersonal processes to multicultural intrapersonal processes. The current research 
zoomed in on two cultures to clearly and parsimoniously answer specific conflict-related 
questions, but it is undeniably important to address the fact that people are not bicultural, 
they are multicultural. A person might possess four cultural identities that pull them 
toward traditional restrooms and only one that pulls them toward gender-neutral 
restrooms. And of course, these five identities will be central to different degrees. While 
it seems daunting to attempt to account for the complexities that must accompany more 
than two cultures (and all of their values, beliefs, rituals, norms, motives, etc.) it is within 
our ability.  
On that note, future research in this area might employ more advanced statistical 
modeling techniques. A structural equation model could answer research questions 
regarding several cultures (e.g., race, nationality, gender, political group, religion), the 
centrality of those cultures, several different decisions (some that get at areas of cultural 
agreement and some at areas of cultural disagreement), and several cultural dimensions 
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(e.g., tightness; Gelfand et al., 2011; relational mobility; Yuki et al., 2007; values; 
Schwartz, 1992) that might mediate or moderate those decisions.  
Conclusion 
 This research posited that not all cultural identities are equally important, 
meaningful, or salient in a given moment or decision-making circumstance, and that this 
notion was glaringly absent from the culture literature. It made novel predictions about 
how the centrality and situational salience (of varying strengths) of conflicting cultural 
identities might interact to influence decision-making. The questions asked and answered 
in this project make important advances in cultural psychology, and the results carry 
implications for many related fields, notably those with a strong interest in judgment and 
decision-making. While the results yield several interesting and important findings, they 
also yield new questions and areas for future investigation. Indeed, the study of 
multicultural cognitive and behavioral processes is young, and there are many questions 
to be addressed. The current research should serve as evidence of the importance and the 
potential for growth in this area of research.  
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Table 1 
Correlations of Democrat and Christian Members with Restroom Choice (Pilot) 
 n Republican/Democrat Atheist/Christian 
Republican/Democrat 
 
536 __  
Atheist/Christian 
 
531 -.10** __ 
Traditional or Gender-
Neutral Restroom 
856  .51**  -.20** 
Note. Religious and political variables are coded as follows: Republican = 0, 
Democrat = 1; Atheist = 0, Christian = 1. Restroom decision is on a scale from  
1 (Traditional) to 7 (gender-neutral). **p < .001 
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Table 2 
Restroom Decision Means, St. Deviations, and Multiple Comparisons of Four Political × 
Religious Groups (Pilot) 
Group (I) N M (SD) Comparison 
Group (J) 
I-J SE p 
AD 37 4.92 (1.99) AR     1.60 .47 .00 
   CD       .79 .33 .08 
   CR 
 
    3.04 .33 .00 
AR 23 3.32 (2.11) AD    -1.60 .47 .00 
   CD      -.81 .40 .18 
   CR 
 
    1.44 .40 .00 
CD 151 4.13 (2.06) AD     -.79 .33 .08 
   AR      .81 .40 .18 
   CR 
 
   2.25 .21 .00 
CR 148 1.88 (1.71) AD   -3.03 .33 .00 
   AR   -1.44 .40 .00 
   CD   -2.25 .21 .00 
Note. AD = atheist-democrat, AR = atheist-republican, CD = Christian-democrat, CR = 
Christian-republican 
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Table 3 
ANOVA Summary Table for Restroom Decision (Pilot) 
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Corrected Model     497.871 3   165.96   52.51 .00 .31 
Intercept   2422.49 1 2422.49 766.43 .00 .68 
Atheist/Christian       59.10 1     59.10   18.70 .00 .05 
Democrat/Republican     176.82 1   176.82   55.94 .00 .14 
AC×DR         5.03 1       5.03     1.59 .21 .00 
Error   1122.07 355       3.16    
Total   5374.27 359     
Corrected Total   1619.93 358     
Note. Bonferroni adjustment applied to p-values; p is significant at α = .05. 
1 R2 = .31 (R2 adjusted = .30) 
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Table 4 
Multiple Regression of Restroom Decision on Christian and Democrat Centrality (Pilot) 
Rest  B SE  R2 
Constant 3.70*** .40   
Christian Centrality -.38*** .08 -.25  
Democrat Centrality   .55*** .09 .32 .17*** 
** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 
Main Study Demographics  
  N % M SD 
Sex  239  64% female - - 
Age  239 - 35.41 14.11 
SES  239  41% Middle Class   2.46   1.05 
Race  239  60% white - - 
Veteran  239   4% veteran - - 
Employment   239  76% employed - - 
Citizenship  239  89% U.S. citizen - - 
Political Group  239 100% Democrat - - 
Religious Group  239 100% Christian - - 
Catholic  239  38% Catholic - - 
Note. Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (working 
class) to 5 (upper class). 
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Table 6 
Restroom Decision Hierarchical Multiple Regression with Covariates 
 Rest  B SE  R2  R2 
Step 1 Constant  5.38*** .41    
 Age   -.02* .01 -.15   
 Sex    .12 .26 .03   
 Restroom Picturing -1.22*** .28 -.26 .08***  
Step 2 Constant  5.42*** .53    
 Age   -.03*** .01 -.19   
 Sex    .05 .25 .01   
 Restroom Picturing -1.00*** .27 -.21   
 Christian Centrality   -.32*** .08 -.23   
 Democrat Centrality    .36*** .09 .23 .17*** .08 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 7 
ANCOVA Summary Table for Restroom Decision 
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Corrected Model     136.701 9    15.19     3.96 .00 .17 
Intercept     563.00 1  563.09 146.68 .00 .46 
Age       33.79 1    33.79     8.80 .00 .05 
Restroom Picturing       19.12 1    19.12     4.98 .03 .03 
Christian Centrality       32.96 1    32.96     8.59 .00 .05 
Democrat Centrality       24.54 1    24.54     6.39 .01 .04 
Situation Strength         1.90 1      1.90       .47 .48 .00 
Christian × Democrat       14.07 1    14.07     3.66 .06 .02 
Christian × Situation           .31 1        .31       .08 .78 .00 
Democrat × Situation         1.02 1      1.02       .27 .61 .00 
Christian × Democrat × Situation         2.20 1      2.20       .57 .45 .00 
Error     664.14 173      3.84    
Total    3529.32 183     
Corrected Total      800.84 182     
Note. Bonferroni adjustment applied to p-values; p is significant at α = .05. 
1 R2 = .17 (R2 adjusted = .13) 
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Table 8 
 
Restroom Decision Adjusted Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group 
     95% Confidence Interval 
Christian Democrat n M SE Lower Upper 
low low 45 3.76 .28 3.19 4.33 
 high 34 5.12 .34 4.45 5.78 
high low 49 3.35 .28 2.79 3.90 
 high 55 3.63 .27 3.12 4.15 
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Table 9 
 
Restroom Decision Adjusted Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group and 
Situation 
      95% Confidence 
Interval 
Christian Democrat Situation n M SE Lower Upper 
low low weak 24 3.86 .40 3.07 4.65 
  strong 21 3.64 .43 2.80 4.48 
 high weak 18 5.28 .46 4.37 6.20 
  strong 16 4.91 .50 3.94 5.89 
high low weak 16 3.69 .49 2.72 4.66 
  strong 33 3.19 .34 2.51 3.86 
 high weak 29 3.51 .37 2.78 4.23 
  strong 26 3.76 .39 3.00 4.53 
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Table 10 
ANOVA Summary Table for Decision Speed 
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Corrected Model          24.091 7         3.44         .29 .96 .01 
Intercept    17886.36 1 17886.36 1486.99 .00 .90 
Christian Centrality              .55 1           .55         .05 .83 .00 
Democrat Centrality            1.77 1         1.77         .15 .70 .00 
Situation Strength            4.09 1         4.09         .34 .56 .00 
Christian × Democrat              .15 1           .15         .01 .91 .00 
Christian × Situation            2.53 1         2.53         .21 .65 .00 
Democrat × Situation            2.70 1         2.70         .23 .64 .00 
Christian × Democrat × Situation          13.38 1       13.38       1.11 .29 .01 
Error      1912.54 159       12.03    
Total    20906.76 167     
Corrected Total      1936.63 166     
Note. Bonferroni adjustment applied to p-values; p is significant at α = .05. 
1 R2 = .01 (R2 adjusted = -.03) 
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Table 11 
Decision Speed Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group and Situation 
      95% Confidence 
Interval 
Christian Democrat Situation n M SE Lower Upper 
low low weak 22 10.64 .74 9.19 12.11 
  strong 18 10.38 .82 8.76 11.99 
 high weak 21 9.95 .76 8.46 11.45 
  strong 16 11.37 .87 9.66 13.08 
high low weak 13 10.37 .96 8.47 12.27 
  strong 24 10.76 .71 9.36 12.16 
 high weak 28 10.97 .66 9.67 12.26 
  strong 25 10.71 .69 9.34 12.08 
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Table 12 
ANOVA Summary Table for Decision Affect 
Source SS df MS F p ηp2 
Corrected Model      17.851 7      2.55     2.21 .04 .07 
Intercept    274.06 1  274.06 237.81 .00 .54 
Christian Centrality          .32 1        .32       .27 .60 .00 
Democrat Centrality        9.57 1      9.57     8.30 .00 .04 
Situation Strength          .01 1        .01       .01 .92 .00 
Christian × Democrat        5.79 1      5.79     5.03 .03 .02 
Christian × Situation          .02 1        .02       .02 .89 .00 
Democrat × Situation          .40 1        .40       .35 .56 .00 
Christian × Democrat × Situation          .55 1        .55       .48 .49 .00 
Error    238.55 207      1.15    
Total    550.13 215     
Corrected Total    256.40 214     
Note. Bonferroni adjustment applied to p-values; p is significant at α = .05. 
1 R2 = .07 (R2 adjusted = .04) 
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Table 13 
 
Decision Affect Adjusted Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group 
     95% Confidence Interval 
Christian Democrat n M SE Lower Upper 
low low 58 1.06 .15 .78 1.35 
 high 42 1.16 .17 .82 1.50 
high low 54 .83 .15 .54 1.13 
 high 62 1.50 .14 1.23 1.78 
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Table 14 
 
Decision Affect Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group and Situation 
      95% Confidence 
Interval 
Christian Democrat Situation n M SE Lower Upper 
low low weak 30 1.05 .20   .67 1.44 
  strong 28 1.08 .20   .68 1.48 
 high weak 21 1.13 .23   .67 1.60 
  strong 21 1.19 .23   .72 1.65 
high low weak 20   .72         .2   .24 1.19 
  strong 34   .90 .18   .54 1.26 
 high weak 31 1.67 .19 1.29 2.05 
  strong 30 1.47 .20 1.09 1.86 
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Table 15 
 
Attentive (PANAS Item) Adjusted Means, Standard Errors, and CIs by Centrality Group 
     95% Confidence Interval 
Christian Democrat n M SE Lower Upper 
low low 58 3.22 .18 2.86 3.59 
 high 42 3.00 .22 2.58 3.43 
high low 54 3.04 .19 2.66 3.41 
 high 62 3.58 .18 3.23 3.93 
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Figure 1. Centrality group means on Restroom Decision for all participants, regardless of 
condition. Values below 4 are toward traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; values 
above 4 are toward gender-neutral restrooms. 
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Figure 2. Centrality group means on Restroom Decision in the weak condition. Values 
below 4 are toward traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; values above 4 are toward 
gender-neutral restrooms. 
  
2
3
4
5
6
Low Christian High Christian
Restroom Decision - Weak Situation
Low Democrat High Democrat
 
 
95 
 
 
Figure 3. Centrality group means on Restroom Decision in the strong condition. Values 
below 4 are toward traditional men’s and women’s restrooms; values above 4 are toward 
gender-neutral restrooms. 
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Figure 4. Centrality group means on Decision Speed (i.e., seconds spent responding to 
Restroom Decision item) in the weak condition. 
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Figure 5. Centrality group means on Decision Speed (i.e., seconds spent responding to 
Restroom Decision item) in the strong condition. 
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Figure 6. Centrality group means on Decision Affect (i.e., emotion related to Restroom 
Decision response) for all participants regardless of condition.  
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Figure 7. Centrality group means on Decision Affect (i.e., emotion related to Restroom 
Decision response) in the weak condition. 
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Figure 8. Centrality group means on Decision Affect (i.e., emotion related to Restroom 
Decision response) in the strong condition. 
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Figure 9. Quadratic relationship between positive affect and Christian 
Centrality.  
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Figure 10. Group means on ‘Attentive’ (i.e., how attentive they were to the restroom  
decision question – from positive affect subscale of PANAS).  
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APPENDIX A 
ADAPTED CENTRALITY SUBSCALE OF THE MIBI  
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1. Overall, being [a member of this culture] has very little to do with how I feel 
about myself. (reverse scored) 
2. In general, being [a member of this culture] is an important part of my self-image. 
3. My destiny is tied to the destiny of other [members of this culture] people. 
4. Being [a member of this culture] is unimportant to my sense of what kind of 
person I am. (reverse scored) 
5. I have a strong sense of belonging to [members of this culture] people. 
6. I have a strong attachment to other [members of this culture] people. 
7. Being [a member of this culture] is an important reflection of who I am. 
8. Being [a member of this culture] is not a major factor in my social relationships. 
(reverse scored) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE  
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Instructions: For each item, please indicate to what extent you feel this way about your 
response to the last question. 
 
Response Items: 1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely 
 
Interested - PA01 
Distressed - NA01 
Excited - PA02 
Upset - NA02 
Strong - PA03 
Guilty - NA03 
Scared - NA04 
Hostile - NA05 
Enthusiastic - PA04 
Proud - PA05 
Irritable - NA06 
Alert - PA06 
Ashamed - NA07 
Inspired - PA07 
Nervous - NA08 
Determined - PA08 
Attentive - PA09 
Jittery - NA09 
Active - PA10 
Afraid - NA10 
 
Scoring: Sum PA items for total Positive Affect score; sum NA items for total Negative 
Affect score. The current research subtracts NA total from PA total for final affect 
composite. 
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APPENDIX C 
WEAK (DEMOCRAT IDENTITY) SITUATION  
  
 
 
108 
 
ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: The following several pages will contain some decision 
scenarios. Please answer as honestly as possible. Please click the 'next' arrow to continue 
with the survey. 
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APPENDIX D 
STRONG (DEMOCRAT IDENTITY) SITUATION 
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ATTENTION, PARTICIPANT: You have been randomly selected to participate in an 
online focus group with other self-identified Democrats. In the focus group, you will be 
discussing your answers to the questions on the next several pages. If you choose to 
participate, your personal information (including your name) will be entirely confidential 
and you will be compensated. There will be an opportunity at the end of the survey to 
indicate whether you would like to be contacted for participation in this focus group. 
Please click the 'next' arrow to continue with the survey. 
 
  
 
 
111 
 
APPENDIX E 
IRB HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH APPROVAL 
 
  
 
 
112 
 
 
